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Abstract
In this article, the authors consider the impact of the institutional and market environment in which Canadian
business operates on the structure of corporate and securities law. The authors argue that the linkages between
markets and law have been neglected by scholars, judges, and regulators concerned with Canadian corporate
and securities law, resulting in the adaption of approaches that are ill-suited to the Canadian environment.
Canadian capital markets, for instance, are characterized by high levels of share ownership concentration, thin
trading problems, intensive inter-corporate linkages, and possibly lower levels of efficiency. In sum, these
factors make the problems occasioned by separated ownership and control (the Berle and Means corporation)
much less acute in Canada than the problems of majority shareholder opportunism. These factors also suggest
that regulatory initiatives should be structured in a way that distinguishes between the problems of large,
intensively traded companies and smaller, thinly traded companies populated by retail investors. The authors
consider these issues in the context of three case studies: the private agreement exception, poison pills, and a
self-interested transaction.
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TOWARD A DISTINCTIVE
CANADIAN CORPORATE
LAW REGIME0
BY RONALD J. DANIELS* & JEFFREY C. MACINTOSH"
In this article, the authors consider the impact of the institutional and
market environment in which Canadian business operates on the structure
of corporate and securities law. The authors argue that the linkages
between markets and law have been neglected by scholars, judges, and
regulators concerned with Canadian corporate and securities law, resulting
in the adaption of approaches that are ill-suited to the Canadian
environment. Canadian capital markets, for instance, are characterized
by high levels of share ownership concentration, thin trading problems,
intensive inter-corporate linkages, and possibly lower levels of efficiency.
In sum, these factors make the problems occasioned by separated
ownership and control (the Berle and Means corporation) much less
acute in Canada than the problems of majority shareholder opportunism.
These factors also suggest that regulatory initiatives should be structured
in a way that distinguishes between the problems of large, intensively
traded companies and smaller, thinly traded companies populated by
retail investors. The authors consider these issues in the context of three
case studies: the private agreement exception, poison pills, and a self-
interested transaction.
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I. INTRODUCTION
During the last decade, the conventional vision of the
corporation and of corporate and securities law has undergone
radical transformation. Early privilege or concessionary paradigms
of the corporation focused on the role of the corporation as a tool
of state policy, and the corporation's core characteristics were
analyzed in terms of how they furthered or hindered the
achievement of the state's objectives.1 More recently, the liberal
contractarian paradigm has placed much greater emphasis on the
formulation of suitable rules for the facilitation of private ordering
arrangements, thereby relegating state obectives to a position of
secondary or even trivial importance. "  Accompanying this
reconstruction of the vision of the corporation in society has been
I See, eg, MA Eisenberg & W.L Cary, Cases and Materials on Corporations, 6th ed.
(Westbury, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1988).
2 For a thorough discussion of the different visions of the corporation and their roots In
broader political theory, see R. Romano, "Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform" (1984)
36 Stan. L Rev. 923.
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a recognition of the role that markets can play in controlling a wide
range of problems that beset the modem corporation.3 Moreover,
acknowledgement of the role that markets play in disciplining
opportunistic behaviour has effected a shift in the justificatory
standards underlying corporate and securities law. Whereas in the
past evidence of opportunistic behaviour by managers or
shareholders was thought sufficient by itself to support legal
intervention, today this evidence must be supplemented by
arguments demonstrating the superiority of legal instruments to their
market competitors.
The recognition that market forces can complement and,
indeed, supplant legal rules, thus, has important implications for the
design of an optimal corporate/securities law regime. Obviously, the
more efficient underlying market mechanisms are in disciplining
corporate conduct, the less the need for legal instruments to
regulate it. And yet, despite the centrality of market efficiency in
the design of appropriate rules, the structure and efficiency of
Canadian markets has often been ignored both by academics and
policy-makers. Do Canadian markets have distinctive properties that
regulators should be sensitive to in formulating policy objectives? If
so, what are these properties and how do they impact on Canadian
corporate law and securities regulation? It is our belief that
Canadian markets do possess distinctive characteristics, especially
when compared to the United States, and that these characteristics
have important implications for the nature of the optimal corporate
and securities regime for Canada. Indeed, we argue that the failure
to consider the distinctive features of Canadian markets may,
especially when foreign approaches are emulated, result in statutory
and judicial approaches to corporate regulation that only crudely fit
the Canadian setting.
3 D.W. Carlton & D.R. Fischel, "The Regulation of Insider Trading" (1983) 35 Stan. L
Rev. 857; F.H. Easterbrook & D.R. Fischel, "Voting in Corporate Law" (1983) 26 J. Law &
Econ. 395; F.H. Easterbrook & D.R. Fischel, "Corporate Control Transactions" (1982) 91 Yale
LJ. 698; D.R. Fischel, "The Corporate Governance Movement" (1982) 35 Vand. L Rev. 1259;
and R.K. Winter, Jr., "State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation"
(1977) 6 J. Legal Stud. 251.
1991]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
II. THE LIBERAL CONTRACTARIAN MODEL
OF CORPORATE LAW
The liberal contractarian vision of corporate law is associated
most powerfully with the law and economics movement. According
to law and economics scholars, firms - of which corporations are a
distinctive species - are best understood as the focal point for a
series of contractual undertakings consummated between the
shareholders, managers, creditors, employees, and suppliers of the
corporation.4 As the locus for these contracts, the corporation is
nothing more than a "nexus of contracts." Through these contracts,
the corporate form achieves its central purpose: enabling parties to
obtain the benefits of task specialization by establishing a framework
conducive to the maintenance of long run relations.
Given that the corporation is viewed as the by-product of a
series of contractual, that is, voluntary and private arrangements,
what is the role for corporate and securities law in this model? A
purely enabling view is expressed by Easterbrook and Fischel, who
argue that the role of courts and legislatures should be confined to
reducing the transaction costs entailed in repeatedly negotiating,
writing, and enforcing these contracts.5 In this vein, legislatures
should design corporate law statutes that embody the agreements
that parties would have concluded in a world without transaction
costs. Corporate statutes are merely the standard form contracts
that the parties would have concluded in this idealized setting.
The keystone of the enabling view is the capital market,
which is the instrumentality for detecting, analyzing, and impounding
information respecting the behaviour of corporate insiders - the
managers and controlling shareholders - into the prices of a
corporation's shares. A well functioning market will allow investors
to anticipate (in a probablistic way) the types and levels of "agency
costs" that may affect their ultimate reward. Such anticipation will
4The nexus of contracts theory is explicated in E.F. Fama & M.C. Jensen, "Separation
of Ownership and Control" (1983) 26 J. Law & Econ. 301 and M. Jensen & W. Meckling,
'Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure" (1976)
3 J. Fin. Econ. 305.
5 The most recent articulation of their position is contained in F.H. Easterbrook & D.R.
Fischel, "The Corporate Contract" (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1416. See also supra, note 3.
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be grounded in both the rational expectations of investors and
historical experience with forms of opportunism generated by
alternative governance structures. Armed with good foreknowledge
of the probability distribution of potential returns, investors can then
appropriately price the financial claims offered in initial public
offering markets. Indeed, in a market that efficiently predicts all
forms of opportunism engaged in by managers and controlling
shareholders, we would expect that investors will pay no more, on
average, than the claims they are purchasing are really worth e
ante. In the economist's lexicon, the market is then a "fair game."
6
This has an important influence on the optimal legal regime
through the mediating influence of the response of corporate issuers.
Faced with a market that is a fair game, issuers will be unable to
fool investors into paying more for securities than they are likely to
be worth, given the probabilities of various forms of opportunism.
In other words, all anticipated agency costs will be passed back to
the issuer. This provides the issuer with a potent incentive to offer
securities with characteristics that will tend to minimize the potential
for future predatory acts either by managers or other investors. In
an efficient market, all cost-justified agency cost reducing measures
will normally be taken without regulatory intervention. For example,
if a "majority of the minority" vote diminishes the probability of
predatory behavior by majority shareholders more than it enhances
the probability of opportunistic minority holdouts, then corporations
will build a majority of the minority voting mechanism into the
corporate charter without being forced to do so.
7
This strong statement of the contractarian view is not
without its critics.8  Some have asserted that externalities and
information asymmetries will impair the functioning of primary
6 It is important to note that this claim does not require all investors purchasing financial
assets at the initial offering stage to be fully informed. Rather, only marginal purchasers need
be fully informed, and, for infra-marginal investors, their errors in pricing need only be
independent and unbiased.
7 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra, note 5.
8 See, ag., V. Brudney, "Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of
Contract" (1985) 85 Colum. L Rev. 1403 and R. Clark, "Agency Costs versus Fiduciary
Duties" in J.W. Pratt & RJ. Zeckhauser, eds, Ptincipals andAgents: The Structure of Business
(Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1985) 55.
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markets In particular, it has been suggested that the determination
of share values at the initial public offering ("iPo") stage is plagued
by considerable indeterminacy and is characterized by the absence of
negotiation between investors and issuer. The argument that ipo
pricing is inaccurate is buttressed by empirical data showing that
wos are generally underpriced and demonstrate considerable
volatility during the period following the initial distribution.10
Other critics appear to have conceded the accuracy of
market pricing at the ipo stage, but assert that corporate insiders will
be able to exploit investors subsequent to the Ipo, when the
corporation's securities are trading in secondary markets. One basis
upon which this critique can be constructed is the reputed failure of
secondary markets to register events of opportunistic exploitation by
causing appropriate adjustments in share prices. However, the more
common criticism levelled against the ability of secondary markets
to take care of themselves is the inability of shareholders to
constrain such exploitation, due to the endemic problem of
"collective action" that faces the shareholders of public corporations.
As originally noted by Mannell and elaborated by Clark,12
Easterbrook, Fischel, 3 and others, many shareholders will have
small, transient interests and will take little interest in gathering
information about prospective directors or proposed fundamental
changes, or indeed in voting at all. While a pooling of interests
might in theory alleviate the incentive problem, such coordination
amongst investors is difficult and expensive and subject to the same
9 See, ag., MA Eisenberg, 'The Structure of Corporate Law" (1989) 89 Colum. L Rev.
1461.
10 See, eg., W. Rotenberg, "Pricing Initial Public Equity Offerings: Who Wins, Who
Loses And Why?" (1990) 3(1) Can. Inv't Rev. 17; R.B. Beatty & J.R. Ritter, "Investment
Banking, Reputation, and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings" (1986) 15 J. Fin. Econ.
213; and K. Rock, "Why New Issues Are Underpriced" (1986) 15 J. Fin. Econ. 187.
11 H.G. Manne, "Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting" (1964) 64 Colum. L. Rev.
1427.
12 R.C. Clark, "Vote Buying and Corporate Law" (1979) 29 Case W. Res. 776.
13 Voting in Corporate Law, supra, note 3.
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incentive and free rider problems as individual action 4  The
proximate consequence of the collective action problem is that direct
shareholder oversight of corporate insiders is attenuated. This
leaves more room for insiders to spearhead corporate behaviour that
redistributes wealth in favour of insiders and away from public
investors. Share prices may quickly and accurately reflect the effect
of such behavior on share prices, but this is cold comfort to
investors who have lost part of their investment stake.
In our opinion, these criticisms miss the mark in relation to
nos. While pricing of primary market offerings is not the product
of direct investor/issuer contact, prices and terms of new issues will
be determined by vigorous bilateral negotiations between the issuer
and the underwriter. The underwriter has powerful incentives to
ensure that the issue is not overpriced or (perhaps equivalently)
issued with terms and conditions that turn out to be unfavourable to
investors. Underwriters are typically large firms that are repeat
players in capital markets. A reputation for overpricing new issues
will quickly become known, causing investors to shun new offerings
brought to market by the offending underwriter. This creates a
strong incentive for the underwriter to ensure that the new issue is
not overpriced 1 5
The participation of institutional investors in the ipo market
will also assist in ensuring that new issues are not overpriced.
Institutional investors typically purchase the lion's share of new
offerings and are almost always canvassed by the underwriters in
advance of the offering in order to determine the degree of
institutional interest. Expressions of displeasure from institutional
buyers will cause the underwriters to alter the terms of issue, or
perhaps even withhold the issue from the market. In this way, the
most sophisticated players in the market will play a very direct role
in establishing the terms of a new issue, belieing the claim that
14 Both individual and collective action are plagued by the problem of "free riders."
Since the efforts of an individual or of a coalition will be captured by all shareholders, this
creates an incentive to let someone else do the work of policing management.
15 On the role that reputation plays in bonding underwriter performance, see Rotenberg,
supra, note 10; . Gordon, 'The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law" (1989) 89 Colum.
L Rev. 1549 at 1558-59; and R. Gilson & R.H. Kraakman, "The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency" (1984) 70 Va. L. Rev. 549 at 620.
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investors are merely passive bystanders in the wo process.16
Although retail investors will not participate in this process, they will
be able to free ride on the efforts of institutional investors, since the
new issue is offered on the same terms to all buyers.
The fact that institutional players are the largest buyers of
new issues will also enhance the reputational penalty associated with
overpricing, since institutional traders are well placed to inflict
damage on opportunistic underwriters by withdrawing lucrative
brokerage and other business from the underwriter. If the
reputation of underwriters is as important as we think it is, the
underwriter may well have an incentive to set a price for new issues
at a price below the true worth of the securities. Between the time
of setting a price and bringing the issue to market, general market
movements may result in the new issue being overpriced.
Underpricing provides insurance against this eventuality. In addition,
underwriters often take call options, at a strike price in excess of
the offering price, as a part of their underwriting fee. Setting a low
offering price is one way to ensure that these options will have
value.
To the extent that underwriters will wish to avoid a bad
reputation with firms seeking to go public, there will be some
constraint on the degree of underpricing which they will be tempted
to engage in. However, those in charge of businesses seeking to go
public will not usually have had extensive experience (or indeed, any
experience) with going public and will also have limited knowledge
of the experience of others doing the same. They will also have a
limited ability to penalize underwriters who fail to ensure that they
receive an adequate price for their securities. Institutional buyers,
on the other hand, are repeat players who frequently return to the
market for new issues and will have ample opportunity to penalize
misbehaving underwriters. Thus, the costs of underpricing a new
16 We do not wish to concede, however, that direct negotiation is a prerequisite to
efficient pricing. As long as buyers are repeat players with the ability to punish cheating
sellers, an efficient contract will be the result even in a "take-it-or-leave-it" situation. See, ag.,
M.J. Trebilcock, "An Economic Approach to the Doctrine of Unconscionability" in BJ. Reiter
& J. Swan, eds, Studies in Contract Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980) at 379.
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issue are likely to pale in comparision to the costs of overpricing the
issue.
17
In the face of the incentives facing underwriters, it is
therefore not surprising that, on average, new issues Are indeed
underpriced. Both this evidence and the considerations we have
outlined above argue that if anyone is likely to be injured by
inaccurate pricing of new issues, it is the issuers themselves and not
the buyers of their securities. Indeed, we find it odd that critics of
the contractarian paradigm would use evidence of underpricing to
bolster their claim in favour of government intervention to protect
investors. The need to protect investors who are profiting
handsomely from new issues is, at the very least, not self-evident.
The participation of sophisticated institutional and block
traders, as well as stock market analysts and brokers, will also tend
to ensure accurate pricing of securities in secondary markets. As in
primary markets, the retail investor will free ride on the efforts of
sophisticated players to discover over- and under-priced securities.
18
This is not to say that we believe that Canadian secondary markets
will always work with perfect efficiency. In the section that follows,
we discuss the evidence bearing on the efficiency of secondary
markets at greater length.
In any case, as we have noted, those who assert that
investors are likely to be taken advantage of at some time
subsequent to the initial offering do not usually focus on the
inability of secondary markets to adequately record the effect of
managerial or shareholder opportunism on share prices. Rather, the
focus is on shareholder collective action problems. Two comments
are in order. First, direct shareholder oversight is not the only
mechanism for constraining opportunistic behavior. Managerial,
product, and capital markets all play a role in disciplining market
participants.1 9 Second, the extent of the collective action problem
17 See, generally, D. Barron, "A Model of the Demand for Investment Banking Advising
and Distribution Services for New Issues" (1982) 27 J. Fin. 955 and D. Barron & B.
Holmstrom, "Ie Investment Banking Contract for New Issues Under Asymmetric
Information: Delegation and the Incentive Problem" (1986) 35 J. Fm. 115.
18 For a fuller description of these effects, see Gilson & Kraakman, supra, note 15.
19 See, eg., RJ. Gilson, "The Case Against Shark Repellant Amendments: Structural
Limitations on the Enabling Concept" (1982) 34 Stan. L. Rev. 775.
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will be greatly alleviated where institutional traders hold stock in the
firm, since such traders will have much better incentives than smaller
investors to monitor insiders and take appropriate action when
harmful conduct is engaged in. Although we will not say much
about Canadian managerial and product markets in this article, we
comment below on how the unique features of Canadian markets
impact on an optimal regime of rules to govern the transfer of
corporate control. We also suggest that both mispricing and
collective action problems will be much more severe for smaller
public firms without institutional investors.
We also note that there is an embedded inconsistency in the
position of those who accept that investors are not mistreated in
primary markets but who assert that they are frequently mistreated
subsequent to the initial offering. Part of what investors purchase
at the primary stage are corporate governance mechanisms with
varying degrees of constraints on insider opportunism. If investors
are systematically exploited at the secondary stage, but primary
markets are efficient, then systematic exploitation that will take
place in the future must be reflected in the price that investors are
willing to pay for their shares at the ipo stage. But this means that
there can be no systematic exploitation. Either the prices at which
new issues are offered will be adjusted by the underwriter or terms
constraining opportunism will be incorporated into the corporation's
charter or its terms of issue. In other words, an efficient primary
market contains a self-correcting mechanism to reduce post-issue
opportunism to the point where the marginal costs of reducing
opportunism are equal to the marginal benefits obtained. Those
who assert that primary markets work well, but secondary markets
do not, bear an onus of explaining why primary markets should fail
in this one crucial respect.
III. THE OPERATION OF CANADIAN CAPITAL MARKETS
A. The Efficiency of Canadian Capital Markets
Market efficiency is defined in relation to various information
sets. A market is said to be efficient in relation to a particular set
of information if market traders cannot realize positive abnormal
[VOL. 29 No. 4
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returns from devising and executing trading strategies based on that
data set. Empirical tests of market efficiency in the United States
have uniformly found that markets are efficient in the "weak form."
That is, abnormal returns cannot be made by trading on the basis of
historical price movements. The vast majority of United States
studies have also found that markets are efficient in the "semi-
strong form," meaning that abnormal returns cannot be realized by
trading on the basis of any information that is publicly available.20
Not surprisingly, the evidence also demonstrates that American
markets are not efficient in the "strong form." This means that
market prices do not impound "inside" or non-public information
into securities prices, and insiders can routinely make abnormal
trading profits.
As in the United States, Canadian financial markets appear
to efficiently impound information concerning historical price
movements and thus appear to be weak form efficient.21 Empirical
tests have also demonstrated that Canadian insiders can
systematically make abnormal trading profits on the basis of inside
information.22 However, the relatively less comprehensive empirical
record confounds confident and sweeping generalization as to the
20 See, ag., R.A. Brealey & S.C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance, 2d ed. (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1984) c. 13; J. Gordon & L Kornhauser, "Efficient Markets, Costly
Information, and Securities Research" (1985) 60 N.Y.U.L Rev. 761; and C.P. Saari, "The
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regulation of the Securities
Industry" (1977) 29 Stan. L Rev. 1031.
21 In respect of weak form efficiency, Rorke et al., on the basis of a study sampling 133
stocks listed on the Toronto and Montreal stock exchanges, concluded that Canadian share
prices were efficient in relation to historical price information. See C.H. Rorke et a!., "The
Random Walk Hypothesis in the Canadian Equity Market" (1976) J. of Bus. Admin. 23.
22 Baesel and Stein examined the trading patterns of two control groups, bank directors
and conventional insiders, in the shares of 111 large industrial companies listed on the
Toronto Stock Exchange over a four year period. They found that these groups were able to
achieve consistently positive abnormal returns ranging from 3.8 per cent to 7.8 per cent,
providing evidence that the market was not strong form efficient. See J.B. Baesel & G.R.
Stein, '"he Value of Information: Inferences from the Profitability of Insider Trading" (1979)
14 J. Fin. Quan. Anal. 553. Fowler and Rorke have reported similar results. After
investigating over 33,000 inside trades over a ten year period, they found that insiders earned
cumulative abnormal returns ranging from 2.9 per cent to 6.7 per cent. See DJ. Fowler &
C.H. Rorke, "Insider Trading Profits on the Toronto Stock Exchange" (1988) 5(1) Can. J.
Admin. Sci. 13. Most recently, these results have been replicated by J.-M. Suret & E.
Cormier, "Insiders and the Stock Market" (1990) 3(2) Can. Inv't Rev. 87.
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efficiency of Canadian capital markets in relation to information that
is publicly available. A number of studies have found that Canadian
mutual fund managers do not, on average, outperform market
indices constructed from shares listed on the Toronto Stock
Exchange.23 On the assumption that professional mutual fund
managers are well placed to uncover and exploit any public
information that is not efficiently impounded in security prices, these
studies supply good evidence that Canadian securities markets, like
those of the United States, are efficient in the semi-strong form.
Other investigations, however, appear to demonstrate semi-strong
form inefficiencies. Studies have found that outsiders could earn
abnormal trading returns by tracking the trading patterns of insiders
as revealed in weekly reports filed with the Ontario Securities
Commission (o.s.c.).? In two separate studies, Charest found that
it was possible to make abnormal trading profits on the basis of
public announcements concerning stock dividends and stock splits.25
Other studies have found slow adjustments of stock prices to new
information, which is also inconsistent with semi-strong form
efficiency.2 6
In the end, it would be simplistic to declare that Canadian
markets either are, or are not, efficient in the semi-strong form. It
is much more likely that certain aspects of Canadian markets
conform to semi-strong efficiency while others do not. In other
words, the market is semi-strong form efficient in relation to some
types of publicly available information but not others.
23 J. Williamson, "Performance of Canadian Mutual Funds, 1961-70" (1971) 36 Bus. Q.
94; D. Grant, "Investment Performance of Canadian Mutual Funds: 1960-74" (1976) 8 J. Bus.
Admin. 1; AL. Calvert & J. Lefoll, "The CAPM Under Inflation and the Performance of
Canadian Mutual Funds" (1980) 12 J. Bus. Admin. 107; AL. Calvert & J. Lefoll,
"Performance and Systematic Risk Stability of Canadian Mutual Funds Under Inflation" (1981)
8 J. Bus. Admin. 279; and W.M. Lawson, "Market Efficiency. The Trading of Professionals
on the Toronto Stock Exchange" (1980) 12 J. Bus. Admin. 41.
24 Fowler & Rorke, supra, note 22 and Suret & Cormier, supra, note 22.
25 G. Charest, "Returns to Dividend Changing Stocks on the Toronto Stock Exchange"
(1980) 12 J. Bus. Admin. 1 and G. Charest, "Returns to Stock Splitting Stocks" (1980) 12 J.
Bus. Admin. 19.
26 See, eg., V.M. Jog & A.L Riding, "Market Reactions of Return, Risk, and Liquidity
to the Creation of Restricted Voting Shares" (1989) 6(1) Can. J. Admin. Si. 62.
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B. The Implications of Uneven Informational Efficiency
The uneven informational efficiency of Canadian capital
markets yields important implications for the formulation of
Canadian corporate and securities laws. An efficient market is a
"fair game," in the sense that the odds of success and failure are
well understood, and investors, on average, will earn what they
expect to earn. In a market that is a fair game, financial claims will
be priced appropriately, both in relation to the business risks they
represent and the risks that minority holders will be opportunistically
exploited by corporate controllers (whether managers or controlling
shareholders). This creates a potent incentive for corporate issuers
to offer securities on terms that tend to minimize the probability the
controllers will engineer transactions that have the effect of
confiscating all or part of the public investors' stake, obviating the
need for state intervention to secure an efficient contract between
firm and stakeholders.
The fact that capital markets have shown themselves to be
responsive to some types of information and not to others means
that regulators should be cautious about initiating policy on the basis
of sweeping generalizations about the efficiency of Canadian capital
markets. In some cases, markets will be efficient, attenuating the
justification for regulatory interference. In other cases, markets will
not be efficient, heightening the argument for intervention.
The existence of periodic inefficiencies in Canadian capital
markets also raises the question of the extent to which the current
institutional structure of the market and the regulation of financial
intermediaries, institutional investors, and other capital market
players advances or impedes the achievement of efficiency. For
example, the Income Tax Act27 limits retirement fund holdings in
foreign assets to 10 per cent of the book value of the portfolio.
This restriction may nurture a "hot-house effect," in which an
excessive amount of capital chases too few investment
opportunities. The result may well be that Canadian corporate
27 S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, s. 206. The federal government has recently proposed a
revision to the Act which will increase the ceiling on foreign assets to 20 per cent over a five
year period. See Bill C-18, 3d Sess., 34th Parl., 1991.
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issuers can foist inferior quality (for example, non-voting or
restricted voting) securities on unwilling institutional investors. A
related result may be the impairment of shareholder "exit"
opportunities, by which institutional shareholders manifest their
disapproval with current management by voting with their feet. If
alternative investment opportunities offer little improvement, there
seems to be little point in selling. The Bank Act,28 in prohibiting
any individual or group acting in concert from owning more than 10
per cent of a Schedule 1 chartered bank may impair the efficiency
with which banks are operated, both by diminishing the incentives of
large block holders to monitor management and by foreclosing the
possibility of removing management by means of a hostile takeover.
The resulting inefficiency may be manifest in part by deficient
incentives for banks to monitor those corporations in which they
hold interests. 29 The rule that prohibits banks from owning more
than 10 per cent of a corporate issuer is also a source of
inefficiency.30 In limiting the size of bank holdings, both the
incentive and the ability of bank managers to monitor corporate
investments is attenuated. The result is virtual sterilization of a
massive pool of investment capital that might be used with potent
effect to ensure that corporate managers do not depart from the
goal of pursuing shareholder wealth maximization. While we are
aware that other considerations bear on the propriety of such policy
initiatives, our point is that the effect of these constraints on the
efficiency of Canadian markets has largely been ignored.
Finally, we note that although the evidence demonstrates
that corporate takeovers are efficiency-enhancing, the existence of
episodic semi-strong inefficiencies in Canadian capital markets raises
the probability that mergers and acquisitions will be motivated more
by a desire to exploit share price inefficiencies than by the
realization of synergistic gains or the replacement of inefficient
28 R.S.C. 1985, c. B-1, s. 100(11).
29 A recent and highly provocative account of the role that restrictions on the investment
activities of various financial institutions have had on furthering corporate unaccountability
may be found in M. Roe, "A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance" (Working
Paper #36) (Columbia: The Centre for Law and Economic Studies, Columbia University
School of Law, 15 November 1989).
3 0 Bank Act, supra, note 28, s. 193(2).
[VOL 29 No. 4
Canadian Corporate Law
management. Although transactions that seek to exploit hidden
values for private gain are essentially redistributional in nature, they
may generate efficiency gains to the extent that such transactions
correct an initially inaccurate market price, thereby moving resources
to their highest valued uses. Since corporate takeovers generate
substantial transaction costs, takeovers motivated by underpricing
may result in private gain while generating a net societal loss,
measured by the opportunity cost of the resources devoted to
effecting the transaction (less the benefit resulting from more
accurate pricing of the corporation's securities). This emphasizes
that the indirect costs of inaccurate security prices may be
substantial and highlights the importance of tailoring market
regulation in ways that contribute to, rather than detract from,
market efficiency.
C. The Second Market
At the risk of oversimplification, Canadian capital markets
are effectively divided into two segments. The first segment consists
of public companies that typically trade in markets characterized by
a large float of publicly traded securities, high liquidity, and high
institutional shareholdings. The second consists of smaller public
companies which exhibit a much smaller float of publicly traded
securities, relatively low liquidity, and low institutional ownership.
Even the Toronto Stock Exchange ( rsE), Canada's largest and most
liquid market, is dominated by the latter. A study by Fowler and
Rorke, for example, found that only 5.3 per cent of the stocks
traded on the TSE could be characterized as widely traded ("fat"
stocks)Y Of the remainder, 35.3 per cent were moderately traded
and 59.4 per cent were infrequently or thinly traded. As the ISE
exhibits the greatest depth of any public exchange in Canada, there
is little doubt that other Canadian exchanges are dominated to an
even greater degree by thinly traded stocks. Recognizing that some
companies will fall in between these two polar types, we nonetheless
31 Fowler & Rorke, supra, note 22.
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adopt the term "second market" to refer to relatively illiquid thinly
traded securities with low institutional participation.
Financial economists (both in this country and elsewhere)
have done remarkably little work, either theoretical or empirical, on
the effects of thin trading on market efficiency. In theory, in an
efficient market, a thinly traded security (like a fat security) should
have a market equilibrium price that is, at any given point in time,
the best estimate of the true worth of the security. However, a
datum of key importance in the second market is the predominance
of retail investors and a corresponding absence of institutional
investors. Institutional funds are directed by sophisticated market
professionals who have the time, training, and ability to monitor
closely the fund's investments. Furthermore, since professionally
managed funds will typically hold larger stakes than retail investors,
the incentive of the managers to closely follow corporate
developments and the performance of management is great
compared to their retail counterparts. The higher level of
monitoring of larger publicly traded companies with a professional
following will tend to ensure more accurate pricing of their traded
securities. New information will be quickly digested and impounded
in the market price. Given the wealth of market experience and
ongoing professional scrutiny of such companies, it is less likely that
analysts will be able to uncover "overpriced" and "underpriced"
securities. In short, the market for the securities of widely held
public companies with institutional followings will tend to efficiently
impound all publicly available information.
Corporations in the second market are far less likely to be
well monitored. These companies are dominated by retail investors,
who will mostly lack the sophistication, time, and investing savvy of
the more experienced institutional investors. Such investors will find
it more difficult to keep up with corporate developments. They will
also frequently find themselves unable to interpret new corporate
events and decide if what has happened (or is about to happen)
bodes well or ill for the corporation. In short, retail investors are
likely to be comparatively poor monitors of corporate and
managerial performance. The price of securities in the second
market is therefore more likely to diverge from semi-strong form
efficiency.
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The bifurcation of the market has potent implications for
corporate governance. The presence of institutional investors serves
as an important check on the freedom of corporate managers and
controlling shareholders to redistribute corporate assets in their
favour at the expense of minority investors. Large investors with
economic clout will find the ear of management much more readily
than retail investors and will possess powers of suasion that can be
used to convince management not to proceed with unwise or
opportunistic initiatives. Owing to their relatively small numbers,
these powers of suasion can be greatly amplified by coordinated
action.3 2 Equally important, should push come to shove, institutional
investors have both the incentive and the economic wherewithal to
fund costly litigation that will benefit all shareholders.33  The
presence of an institutional clientele is therefore likely to lessen
greatly the probability of unwise or opportunistic plays by corporate
insiders.
In the second market, this significant source of oversight will
be lacking. Retail investors with small, transient stakes and lacking
a great deal of sophistication will not share the incentives of
institutional investors to closely monitor corporate behaviour. They
are also less likely to have access to the press, and their absence of
economic power will mean that they will be able to exert little
influence over management. Furthermore, small retail stakeholders
will be both less willing and less able, either individually or
collectively, to resort to judicial protection of legal entitlements. As
a result, public investors in the second market will be exposed to a
much higher risk of predatory conduct by corporate insiders.
32 For example, when Southam brought forward shark repellent proposals some years ago,
institutional investors played a key role in convincing management to water down the
proposals. See, eg., J. Partridge, "Foes of Southam-Torstar Deal to Get Day in Court" The
[Toronto] Globe and Mail (27 October 1988) B5. Institutional players also played a role in
convincing Crownx management to abandon a planned dual class recapitalization. See, ag.,
M. Mittelstaedt, "Chock One Up for CN Pension Fund" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (12
April 1986) B2 and K. Howlett, "Crownx Drops Controversial Share Plan" The [Toronto]
Globe and Mail (17 April 1986) B5.
33 The Canadian Tire saga and the formation of the Class A Shareholders' Committee
is ample testimony to both the power and motivation of institutional investors to protect their
interests. See Re Canadian Tire Corporation (13 February 1987), 10 O.S.C.B. 858, 35 B.L.R.
56 (O.S.C.), aff'd 35 B.LR. 117, 37 D.LR. (4th) 94 (Div. Ct.), leave to appeal refused 35
B.LR. (C.A.) [hereinafter Canadian Tire].
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Thin trading also affects the availability of a variety of
dissenters' rights available to the disgruntled shareholder. In
connection with a variety of fundamental corporate changes, both
federal and provincial corporations legislation allow shareholders to
effectively "put" their shares to the corporation at a "fair value" to
be determined by a court.34 Where there is thin trading, Canadian
courts have tended to completely disregard market price in assessing
"fair value" and have based their determinations of value principally
on a discounted cash flow analysis 35 Because appraisal hearings
usually proceed in an adversarial manner, with each side calling
expert witnesses to establish fair value, this results in increased cost,
delay, and uncertainty for the dissenting shareholder of a thinly
traded corporation.
It will also be easier for insiders to manipulate the price of
thinly traded securities, since the volume of buy and sell transactions
necessary to move the market price will be far less than for large
public companies. As a result, fraudulent insiders will find that they
are able to finance market manipulation out of their own capital.
All of these factors combine to suggest that the nature of
corporate governance issues facing corporations in the second
market will differ in many respects from those facing corporations in
the first market. There would appear to be a greater role in the
second market for regulatory law that constrains the behaviour of
corporate insiders, including both managers and controlling
shareholders.
Despite this, the law currently treats all public corporations
identically, whether they belong to the first or second market. We
believe that the law makes too few distinctions between corporations
in the first and second markets. The lesser degree of oversight,
higher probability of insider predation, and less efficient stock
3 4 See, eg., Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, ss 190(3) and 206(3)
[hereinafter CB.C.A.] and Ontario Business Corporations Act, S.O. 1982, c. 4, ss 184, 187, and
188 [hereinafter O.B.C.A.].
35 The fact that thinly traded stocks are more likely to deviate from a "true" or
equilibrium value is good reason to supplement market price with other measures of value.
However, completely disregarding market price in measuring the fair value of thinly traded
stocks overlooks a rich source of information and is a practice which one of us has strongly
criticized elsewhere. See J.G. MacIntosh, 1The Shareholders' Appraisal Right in Canada: A
Critical Reappraisal" (1986) 24 Osgoode Hall L.J. 201 at 286-88.
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pricing in the second market suggest that stricter rules should attach
in this context.
We also believe that some elements of the current regulatory
environment contribute to the bifurcation of the market into first
and second markets. Outstanding amongst these are "legal for life"
restrictions that force fund managers to eschew investments in start-
up or higher risk corporations that form a large part of the second
market. Such restrictions are at odds with current financial theory
that emphasizes that the relevant risk for a fund manager is the risk
of the portfolio and not the riskiness of individual stocks in the
portfolio. Indeed, focusing on the riskiness of individual securities,
rather than of the portfolio as a whole, can lead managers to
achieve sub-optimal diversification to the disadvantage of the fund's
beneficial owners. We therefore applaud momentum in the
direction of substituting legal for life restrictions with more general
"prudent investor" standards. We also hope that the courts will have
the wisdom to interpret the newer standard in light of state-of-the-
art financial theory, which strongly suggests that a judicious mixture
of safe and risky investments is the optimal way to achieve the
highest return for a given level of portfolio risk.3 6
There are limits to the degree to which the law can be used
as an instrument to improve informational efficiency in the second
market. To an extent, the focus of media and market analysts on
larger public corporations reflects a fascination with the large and
powerful, rather than the small and unglamorous. It is no accident
that the front pages of the financial press are populated with stories
about comparatively large public companies with a high profile in
the marketplace. These are the stories that attract public attention
and help sell newspapers. Further, investment analysts will generally
find retail investors more resistant to buying securities of companies
36 Although, where it has been adopted, the change to a "prudent investor" standard
apparently has not yet resulted in an appreciable increase in demand for previously prohibited
stocks, this may be attributable to the fact that there is a paucity of case law giving content
to this somewhat vague test. As a consequence, it can be surmised that institutional investors,
fearful of potential liability, will continue for a time to gravitate to the safe harbour of the
relatively certain standards defined by legal for life tests. Perhaps, in time, as a body of
precedent interpreting the content of the "prudent investor" test is amassed, institutional
investors will feel more confident in deviating from the pattern of investment prescribed in
legal for life rules.
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they have never heard of. Coupled with the fact that many
institutional clients will prefer to invest in "name" companies with
healthy floats, investment professionals will find it rational to devote
more (and perhaps even most) of their time to monitoring larger
deeply traded concerns.
Thin trading also imposes an implicit and possibly
unavoidable tax on the holding of large blocks. In theory, the
purchase or sale of a large block of securities should have little or
no impact on market price. Securities of equal risk and expected
return are perfect substitutes and, absent new information about the
risk or expected return of a given security, the volume of trading
should not affect the prie 37 Indeed, empirical investigations in the
United States of widely traded stocks show that large block trades
have only a small effect on market price, and those fluctuations in
market price are mostly attributable to cases in which the market
suspects that the trader is motivated to trade by the possession of
inside information.38 However, as indicated, Canadian markets are
dominated by thinly traded securities. Particularly in the second
market, where public floats are small, the purchase or sale of a large
block of securities may have a more substantial impact on both the
acquisition and sale price for big buyers. This will cause institutional
and fund investors to shy away from ownership of such securities in
order to avoid the entry and exit "tax."39
Despite these natural limitations on the extent to which
public policy can be used to unify first and second markets, we
believe that the law may be able to play a larger role than at
present in improving the informational efficiency of private markets,
The "substitution" effect should dominate the "price pressure" effect. See, ag., M.S.
Scholes, 'The Market for Securities: Substitution Versus Price Pressure and the Effects of
Information on Share Prices" (1972) 45 J. Bus. 179. Frequently, heavy trading is associated
with the arrival of new information and is thus often associated with large price movements.
However, in such cases, it is the new information and not the heavy trading which causes the
price movement.
3 8 Ibid.
39 So far as we know, there is but a single Canadian study on point. Close found price
reactions to block trades similar to those in the United States. See N. Close, "Price Reaction
to Large Transactions in the Canadian Equity Markets" (1975) 31(6) Fin. Anal. J. 50.
However, the study did not focus on those corporations in the second market, for which we
believe different results might have been achieved.
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by centralizing information gathering in a readily accessible data pool
available across the country at minimal cost. Although provincial
governments currently collect and make available to the public a
variety of information and documents, such as the identities of
corporate directors and a copy of the articles of incorporation
(indicating the terms of outstanding securities), obtaining this
information may sometimes be difficult and time consuming.
Depositing the terms of issue of securities, identities of directors and
significant shareholders, the latest corporate balance sheet and
earnings statement, and other pertinent information in an on-line
computer system accessible by outsiders through telephone contact
would avoid the need for costly duplication of information gathering
services by investors and investment analysts. In our view, such a
system would greatly lower the cost of obtaining important
information about corporate issuers and would easily return its cost
to the investing public. Such a service might indeed even be
extended (at somewhat greater cost) to include press reports noting
or commenting on corporate developments.
More generally, we suggest that it would be profitable to
refocus regulatory attention on producing an empirical mapping of
the marketplace, in order to substitute an empirically grounded
identification of market inefficiencies for the sort of guess-making
that all too often informs (or misinforms) current regulatory
thinking. In particular, provincial regulators should make available
funds for carrying out event studies indicating the consequences of
a variety of corporate events (for example, the creation of restricted
voting shares, corporate mergers and acquisitions, spin-offs, sell-offs,
et cetera) on the value of stakeholder claims. An empirically
grounded identification of market inefficiencies (or efficiencies)
would improve the quality of public policy in the corporate and
securities law domain.
In addition, we urge policy-makers to turn their attention to
the perhaps unintended ways in which regulatory interventions (like
legal for life rules) sometimes detract from, rather than enhance
market efficiency. Regulatory interventions promulgated without a
consideration of the full range of effects on market efficiency are
like drugs with unanticipated side-effects. A failure to recognize the
origins of market inefficiencies may result in treating the
symptomatology of the illness, rather than the underlying disease.
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D. Concentrated Share Ownership
One of the most distinctive features of Canadian capital
markets is the high degree of concentration of share ownership.
Only 14 per cent of the companies that make up the TSE 300
Composite Index are widely held. Of the remainder, 60.3 per cent
are owned by a single shareholder with legal control (in excess of 50
per cent of the voting shares). 25.4 per cent are owned either by
one shareholder with effective control (between 20 per cent and
49.9 per cent of the voting shares) or by two or three shareholders
(each owning between 10 per cent and 20 per cent of the
outstanding voting shares of the corporation) having the ability to
combine and establish joint legal or effective control.40 In contrast,
American markets are characterized by a much greater
preponderance of widely held companies. Approximately 63 per
cent of the companies that make up the Fortune 500 companies are
widely held, and 18 per cent are controlled by a shareholder or
group of shareholders with effective control. Only about 12 per
cent are controlled by a shareholder or group of shareholders with
legal control.4 1
The predominance of shareholder controlled corporations in
Canada changes the nature of conflicts that are likely to be
important. Large block holders have better incentives than small
investors to monitor management, since poor management affects
the interests of a large stakeholder much more substantially than a
small investor with a transient interest. Furthermore, the free rider
problem that commonly makes coordinated shareholder action
difficult is ameliorated, since a much more substantial portion of the
benefits of monitoring is captured by the large block holder. The
result will be more effective monitoring of hired managers.
Moreover, since the controlling shareholder will effectively control
the board of directors, which is legally empowered to hire and fire
40 This data was derived from a variety of sources, including the TSE 300 Composite
Inder (April 1990) and from Canadian Business (June 1989).
41 This data was based on the list of companies contained in the 1990 Forune 500 (23
April 1990). Information on shareholdings was obtained from the Disclosure database
(Micromedia). We were unable to classify 6.6 per cent of the companies on the Fortune 500
list.
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managers, underperforming (or cheating) managers can be displaced
quickly and efficiently, without the need to requisition a
shareholders' meeting.42
As a result, manager/shareholder conflicts are likely to be a
less serious problem in Canada than in the United States, where
widely held public corporations dominate. By the same token,
however, the potential for inter-owner conflicts of interest is
exacerbated. A controlling shareholder may abuse its power of
control to engineer transactions that redistribute wealth to itself at
the expense of minority shareholders. The controller might, for
example, instruct the directors to deal with another controlled entity
on non-commercial terms. Or the controller might spearhead a sale
of corporate assets to another controlled entity, again at non-
commercial prices. Controllers who are also managers may consume
excessive salaries or other perquisites, or, without the fear of a
hostile takeover bid to motivate them, may consume excessive leisure
and manage poorly. There are many other possibilities for
redistribution of corporate assets away from the minority (or from
corporate creditors). Thus, although the power of control may be
used beneficially - to monitor managers more closely - it may also
be used injuriously to effect wealth transfers from one group of
investors to another.
A concentration of share ownership will also blunt the
effectiveness of oversight by institutional shareholders. As discussed
further below, the Canadian market is characterized by the existence
of many large webs of affiliated companies ultimately sharing a
common controller. Institutional shareholders, like banks, insurance
and trust companies, may justifiably fear loss of business or loss of
access to preferential information flows should they oppose wealth-
reducing management initiatives. Where the corporation in question
is part of a larger empire, the economic threat to withdraw business,
42 Where the manager is also a director, a shareholder vote will be necessary to remove
the director in mid-stream. See, ag., CB.C.A., supra, note 34, s. 109(1) and O.B.C.A., supra,
note 34, s. 122(1). However, leaving fired officers on the board (and dropping them off the
slate of directors at the next annual meeting) will be of little consequence if the shareholder
controls a majority of appointments to the board, other than the manager(s) in question. In
some cases, it may be necessary to requisition a shareholders' meeting to remove directors,
but this is easier for a controlling shareholder to do than for a group of otherwise
unconnected public shareholders. See CB.CA., ibid. s. 143 and O.B.C.A, ibid. s. 105.
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whether explicit or implicit, can be a very potent one. In our view,
the recent experience with poison pills in Canada furnishes
anecdotal support for the claim that institutional voters are not
immune from the effects of managerial pressure.
Recent empirical evidence from the United States confirms
the role of ownership concentration in disciplining management. A
study by Karen Wruck, for example, found that private sales of
equity that had the effect of furthering the concentration of
ownership interest resulted, on average, in increases in firm value.43
The study also confirms, however, that increased concentration of
firm ownership may result in some cases in a reduction in firm value.
This is strongly suggestive of the pernicious influences to which firm
control may be put. The results of the Wruck study are supported
by another study that found that as managerial ownership increased,
on average, firm value increased.44 This study found, however, that
the increase in value was not monotonic. Increases in managerial
ownership below a 5 per cent ownership level appeared to increase
firm value, while increases between 5 per cent and 25 per cent
decreased firm value. Increases above the 25 per cent threshold
again increased firm value. The second study hypothesizes that, over
the intermediate range of managerial ownership, the negative effects
of increased power of control dominate the positive influence
resulting from a greater alignment of interest between controllers
and shareholders. 4T
As compared to the United States, a jurisdiction with a
predominance of widely held public corporations, the focal axis of
agency problems in Canada is thus likely to be inter-investor
conflicts, rather than investor-manager conflicts. This does not
suggest that the appropriate substantive content of fiduciary norms
dealing with inter-investor conflicts in Canada should be different
than in the United States. It does, however, suggest that Canadian
K.H. Wruck, "Equity Ownership Concentration and Firm Value: Evidence from
Private Equity Financings" (1989) 23 J. Fin. Econ. 3.
44 R. Morck, A. Shleifer & R.W. Vishny, "Management Ownership and Market
Valuation" (1988) 20 J. Fin. Econ. 293.
45 See also J. Pound, "Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight" (1988)
20 J. Fin. Econ. 237 and J.A. Brickley, R.C. Lease, & C.W. Smith, Jr., "Ownership Structure
and Voting on Antitakeover Amendments" (1988) 20 J. Fin. Econ. 267.
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courts, regulators, and legislators ought to focus more attention than
has been the case in the past on inter-shareholder relations and the
ways in which shareholder powers of control may be used to effect
purely redistributive and socially unproductive transactions. It is
particularly odd, for example, that while controlling shareholders in
the United States have been impressed with fiduciary duties for over
half a century, it is still conventional wisdom in Anglo-Canadian law
that shareholders - whether majority, controlling, or otherwise - owe
no fiduciary duty, either to the company or to fellow investors.4 6
We applaud judicial efforts to fashion a de facto fiduciary duty of
shareholders through the statutory oppression remedy.4 7 In addition,
we are encouraged that Ontario regulators have recently made
moves to regulate related party transactions by promulgating revised
Ontario Securities Commission (o.s.c.) Policy 9.1.48
The predominance of shareholder controlled corporations in
Canada also has implications for the focus of the debate over rules
governing changes in corporate control. Changes of control in
Canada are far more likely to be consummated as private sales of
control blocks or negotiated transactions than as hostile takeover
bids. Indeed, of the 1,148 merger and acquisition transactions
tracked by Venture Economics in 1989, only 7 resulted in
management resistance or more than one bidder entering the fray.49
As a result, the rules governing private changes in control are of
much greater importance in this country than in the United States,
where the hostile takeover is a much more common means of
effecting a transfer of control. Rules that tend to impede or
discourage private changes of control will have serious consequences
for the efficiency of Canadian enterprise. As cogently argued by
46 See J.G. MacIntosh, "Minority Shareholder Rights in Canada and England: 1860-
1987" (1989) 27 Osgoode Hall L.J. 561 and J.G. MacIntosh, "Corporations" in Law Society
of Upper Canada Special Lectures, 1990 (Toronto: DeBoo, 1991) 189. For an attempt to
explain this anomaly, see J.G. MacIntosh, J. Holmes & S. Thompson, "The Puzzle of
Shareholder Fiduciary Duties" (1991) 19 Can. Bus. LJ. 86.
47 Corporations, ibid.
48 Discussed infra, notes 174-187 and accompanying text.
49 The seven transactions involved Dickenson Mines, Falconbridge, Connaught
Biosciences, Plastibec Ltde., Global Communications, Core-Mark International, and Steinberg
Inc.
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Easterbrook and Fischel, rules that either mandate equal sharing of
a control premium or extension of a private offer to all shareholders
on the same terms are very likely to reduce the number of
corporate control transactions.5 0
E. Highly Interconnected Corporate Relationships
Another central characteristic of Canadian capital markets is
the dominance of highly interconnected corporate empires. One
measure of this interconnectedness can be derived from inter-
corporate ownership patterns. Of the top one hundred most
profitable companies in Canada in 1987, close to 45 per cent held
10 per cent or more of the voting shares of another company on
the list.51 The extensive holdings of Hees International Bancorp.,
Power Corporation of Canada, and Olympia and York are
illustrative of the highly incestuous nature of the Canadian corporate
community. These linkages are further buttressed by extensive cross
appointments of Canadian directors. Of the top one hundred most
profitable companies in Canada, we found that 296 of 1023 directors
held two or more appointments. One director, Trevor Eyton, held
nine. 71.1 per cent of these board appointments were held by
directors with only one appointment, 17.5 per cent by directors with
two appointments, and 11.4 per cent by directors with three or more
appointments. In contrast, American data reveal corresponding
figures of 81.8 per cent, 11.1 per cent, and 7.1 per cent.52 The
higher concentration in Canada is particularly significant when it is
remembered that there are approximately one-tenth as many
corporations in Canada as in the United States. Thus, even an
identical proliferation of cross-appointments (in percentage terms)
will, against the background of a much smaller economy, indicate a
much more highly interconnected corporate sphere.
50 Corporate Control Transactions, supra, note 3.
51 This figure was derived from a variety of research sources.
52 See J.M. Pennings, Interlocking Directorates (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1980) figure
4 at 66. Pennings's data was derived from a 1977 study of 797 organizations.
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The proliferation of corporate interconnectedness and
interlocking directorships will have an impact on the efficacy of the
oversight exercised by independent directors. The effectiveness of
independent directorships in protecting minority investors has been
subject to severe criticism even in the United States, where the
corporate sector is much less concentrated and less dominated by
controlling shareholders. Inside directors control the flow of
information to outside directors and set agendas for board meetings.
Although shareholders must elect directors, insiders (particularly the
CEO) will control the nomination process and will effectively
determine who sits on the board5 3  This clearly creates a
disincentive for outside directors to question management policy,
especially given the generous fees often paid to directors of public
corporations. And, in fact, empirical investigations of the
performance of independent directors have uniformly cast grave
doubts on their effectiveness5 4 The pressures on outside directors
to conform to the wishes of corporate insiders can only be
exacerbated in Canada, where directors who are nominally
"independent!' may be employed by, or have business links to one or
more of the corporations in an extended corporate empire. For
example, a director employed by a related corporation under
common control may have a legitimate fear that loss of employment
will be the proximate result of opposing management. Even
directors who have no employment ties with any corporation in a
web of companies may be employed by a company that does or
hopes to do business with one or more companies in the affiliated
group. The conflict of interest will be particularly potent for
investment bankers whose employers do a vast amount of business
with sprawling corporate empires containing numerous companies.
It will often be difficult, we suggest, for such directors to keep their
See V. Brudney, 'The Independent Director. Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?"
(1982) 95 Harv. L Rev. 597 and M.L Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality (Boston: Division
of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1971).
54 See, ag, Mace, ibiaS; T.H. White, Directors: Power or Pawns? (Don Mills, Ont.: CCH,
1978); and B.D. Baysinger & H.N. Butler, "Revolution Versus Evolution in Corporation Law:.
The ALI's Project and the Independent Director" (1984) 52 Geo. Wash. L Rev. 557. Most
recently, see J.W. Lorsch & E. MacIver, Pawns or Potentates: The Reality of America's
Corporate Boards (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1989).
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gaze fixed steadfastly on the welfare of the firm and minority
investors and to forget the potential consequences of piquing
management's ire.
For similar reasons, we have doubts about the serviceability
of "independent" fairness opinions and valuations rendered by
investment bankers. Corporate management will select an
investment banker to render a fairness opinion. The same managers
will select the firm's underwriters and, depending on the nature of
the business carried on by the firm, may also be in a position to
parcel out lucrative brokerage business to investment bankers. An
investment banker anxious to protect or secure future business with
an issuer will find it difficult - though not impossible - to deliver a
fairness opinion or valuation at odds with management's declared
view. These pressures are intensified by the small size of the
Canadian financial community, where conflicts of interest will be
virtually unavoidable. Recent linkages between banks and securities
dealers magnify these potential conflicts 5 The large banks that
dominate the Canadian economic landscape will frequently be large
lenders to (or deposit takers from) the issuer commissioning the
fairness opinion or valuation. Like the underwriting and brokerage
business carried on by the investment banker, this business will in a
very real sense be held hostage by the issuer pending a favourable
opinion or valuation.
These pressures will be magnified where the issuer is part of
an extended empire. In such a case, the investment banker (and
perhaps its associated banking parent) may rightly fear loss of the
business not only of the particular issuer, but some or all of the
business of a large group of affiliated corporations.
In addition to having a strong incentive to deliver a biased
fairness report or valuation, the investment banker will have ample
opportunity to do so. The fairness report or valuation will depend
critically on the values attributed to a variety of highly uncertain
parameters, like the discount rate, time horizon, and expected cash
flows. Relatively small adjustments in some or all of these
parameters can easily produce the result desired by management.
55 For example, Nesbitt Thomson Deacon Inc., RBC Dominion Securities Inc.,
ScotiaMcLeod Inc., and Toronto Dominion Securities Inc., all have links with major Canadian
banks.
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Precisely because valuation is such an uncertain science, producing
a broad range of possible answers, a valuation can be "cooked"
without the results appearing patently unreasonable.
Therefore, both the "downside" to delivering an
unfavourable report to management (losing business) and the
"upside" to delivering a favorable one (gaining business). are
potentially enormous. By comparison, the downside to delivering a
report generously skewed in management's favour seems trivial,
given the very slim likelihood that legal liability or other untoward
consequences will attach.
Indeed, we would argue that management can play a
generous role in ensuring that the valuer produces the "appropriate"
valuation, even aside from exerting overt or covert pressure on the
valuer or using its economic clout to create an apprehension that an
undesirable result (from management's view) will create a loss of
business. Valuation in the face of uncertainty depends keenly on
intimate knowledge of the unique problems and prospects of the
particular business venture. An accurate valuation conducted by
even a truly independent outside party depends on the ability and
willingness of management to communicate intangible as well as
tangible factors to the valuer. It seems clear to us that management
has a sharp informational advantage over any outside party. For
one thing, the managers will be experts in the particular business
in question, while the valuer will not. For another, the managers
will be intimately involved in the enterprise on a day-to-day basis,
giving them a peculiarly favourable perspective from which to
evaluate the business and its prospects. It also seems clear that
managers have incentives to withhold information that is damaging
to their asserted position. In saying this, we do not mean to suggest
that managers are routinely guilty of conscious wrongdoing in such
situations, but merely that, when self-interest intervenes, it is bound
to alter the colouration of facts presented to the valuer, whether
consciously or not. For this reason, even a fairness opinion or
valuation conducted by a genuinely disinterested third party must be
regarded with caution. It is not surprising that fairness opinions and
valuations obtained by management are almost always consistent with
management's views.
1991]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
F. Conclusion
We have traced out some of the most important
characteristics of Canadian capital markets, particularly those
features that distinguish our markets from those south of the border.
These characteristics have important implications, not only for
market efficiency, but for the appropriate content of rules governing
the operation of Canadian markets. Our conclusions on matters of
substantive law are admittedly both sketchy and tentative. However,
the main point that we wish to make is that the substantive content
of market regulation must be carefully informed by a keen
understanding of the empirics of the market. It is our contention
that this understanding has heretofore largely been absent. In our
view, the time has arrived for those who construct the rules to base
public policy on facts and not merely enlightened guesstimates of
"what's broke" and how to fix it.
IV. THE OPERATION OF THE CANADIAN CORPORATE
AND SECURITIES LAW MARKET
One of the purposes of this paper is to direct attention to
the linkage between the institutional structure of Canadian markets
and the achievement of regulatory objectives in the corporate
domain. In this section, we focus on the relationship between the
regulatory structure of the Canadian corporate and securities law
market and the achievement of regulatory objectives. More
particularly, we look at how power is distributed between the
securities regulators and the courts and how this impacts on the
substance of regulatory outcomes.
A. Differences in Corporate and Securities Law in Canada
The two primary instrumentalities for regulating corporate
conduct and securities markets are the courts and the securities
regulators. For example, a matter involving an alleged breach of
fiduciary duty can be resolved by means of private litigation in the
courts or by administrative action to sanction the putative
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wrongdoers. There are a great many differences between these two
forms of oversight. The formulation of regulatory policy by
securities regulators, whether expressed in statutory amendments,
regulations, or the issuance of policy statements, frequently involves
the invited participation of the financial community, often through
the device of holding public hearings to assess proposed regulatory
changes. Where hearings are held, whether in respect of general
policy initiatives or particular instances of alleged wrongdoing, they
are almost always conducted in an informal manner, with little
attention paid to procedural niceties or rules of evidence. This
often means that securities regulators can intervene much more
expeditiously than can a court. The cease trade and denial of
exemptions powers, moreover, give Canadian securities regulators a
very wide discretion to act "in the public interest."5 6 This introduces
a high degree of flexibility and adaptability into administrative
proceedings before securities regulators, a flexibility which is
heightened by virtue of the fact that securities regulators do not
consider themselves bound by the doctrine of stare decisis, nor by
adherence to judicial standards of proof. Furthermore, an
administrative proceeding can be commenced at the instance of the
Commission itself, rather than at the instance of aggrieved private
parties.5 7
This differs markedly from the manner in which adjudication
occurs in the courts. Judicial policy is formed in the crucible of a
particular dispute brought to court by private litigants.58 As a
consequence, whatever policy arguments are put forward will be
presented with a view to buttressing the case of one or other of the
56 See, ag., Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 466, ss 123 and 124 [hereinafter
a.sA].
57 Under both the CB.CA and the O.B.CA, the Director (and sometimes the O.S.C.
under the Ontario legislation) may in some circumstances commence an action on behalf of
minority interests asparenspatriae. See, generally, P. Anisman, "The Commission as Protector
of Minority Shareholders" in Special Lectures of the Law Society of Upper Canada, 1989:
Securities Law in the Modem Financial Marketplace (Toronto: De Boo, 1989) 451 at 490-93
[hereinafter Special Lectures of the Law Society of Upper Canada, 1989] (discussing the Ontario
legislation only). These powers have indeed been used. See, eg., Spaling v. Royal Trustco
(1984), 24 D.LR. 245 (Ont. CA.). However, this form of action is still the exception, and
most cases that arrive in court do so at the behest of private litigants claiming injury.
58 Abid.
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private parties. The public interest will not necessarily be
represented. Furthermore, the argumentation will tend to be much
more closely focused on the content of past precedent and the
application of such precedent to the facts at hand. Although policy
arguments may be presented, they will usually assume a considerably
less important role in a judicial than an administrative proceeding.
Added to this is the fact that judicial proceedings are highly
formalized, with rules of procedure and evidence rigidly adhered to.
This will restrict the range of facts that achieve legal relevance and
will further diminish the importance of broad ranging policy or
empirically based arguments. Finally, court rulings will tend not to
lend themselves to broad statements of policy as well as Commission
adjudications do, and the precedent which emerges is often more
highly fact specific.
It is our contention that the choice of regulatory instrument
and the division of power between the courts and securities
administrators have a potentially far-reaching impact on the number
and range of disputes that are brought forward for adjudication.
The selection of disputes brought before the courts by private
litigants is subject to collective action problems. Particularly in the
second market, where many or most shareholdings are small and
transient, it will not pay for any shareholder to be the mouse who
bells the cat.59 By comparision, securities regulators may select for
hearings those disputes which they feel most implicate the public
interest, and collective action problems do not interfere with this
selection. For this reason, the number and choice of matters that
will be adjudicated if courts are the only regulatory forum will differ
from those adjudicated where only the administrative option is
available.
For a number of reasons, we further hypothesize that the
substantive outcomes of these disputes will be influenced by the
forum in which the matter is heard. As indicated, administrators
pay minimal attention to either rules of procedure or evidence. By
contrast, the courts follow a rigidly formal procedure: for example,
pre-trial pleadings, discoveries, and a highly stylized adjudication
process. Strict rules of evidence apply. These procedural and
Collective action problems are discussed supra, notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
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evidentiary strictures will greatly influence both the choice of facts
that achieve legal relevance and the manner in which these facts are
presented. Some facts which are admitted to administrative
proceedings will be excluded in a court hearing. This cannot help
but influence the substantive outcomes of cases' °
In addition, the differences in available sanctions can
obviously generate different substantive outcomes. For one thing,
a court has the full range of legal and equitable remedies at its
disposal (and indeed, has an even wider selection of remedies under
the statutory oppression remedy), and might, for example, award
damages, a sanction not open to securities regulators. However, the
administrators have their own advantages. As indicated, the powers
to cease trading a transaction or deny trading exemptions in the
"public interest" are extremely flexible tools that can be used quickly
to respond to novel forms of transactions or abuse. Particularly
because many complex transactions are difficult to unwind (and
interlocutory relief is not always available in the courts), the ability
to respond quickly and flexibly may be a key factor in determining
the outcome of the case. Moreover, the open-ended nature of the
regulators' discretionary sanctions allows for substantively different
outcomes than those in the courts. The malleability of these tools
has, for example, enabled the o.s.c. to recognize the existence of
shareholder fiduciary duties, when the courts have not yet clearly
done so.61 More generally, the o.s.c. has indicated that it will
consider imposing a cease trade or denial of exemptions order even
though there is no breach of a legal requirement found in any
statute, regulation, or even policy statement.62
60 See J.R.S. Prichard, "A Systematic Approach to Comparative Law:. The Effect of
Cost, Fee and Financing Rules on the Development of the Substantive Law" (1988) 17 .
Legal Stud. 451.
61 See Canadian Tre, supra, note 33. See, generally, Anisman, supra, note 57 at 463-
475; Corporations, supra, note 46; and Minority Shareholder Rights in Canada and Englan&
1860-1987, supra, note 46.
62 Anisman, ibid. The open-ended texture of the statutory oppression remedy has also
enabled courts to cast aside many of the common law limitations confronting corporate
plaintiffs. However, even with a mandate as broad as that furnished by the oppression
remedy, the courts have not yet explicitly recognized the existence of shareholder fiduciary
duties. This is good evidence that there are still likely to be occasional differences in
substantive outcomes as between courts and securities regulators. See also First City Financial
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Of course, decisions of securities regulators are generally
appealable to the courts,63 and in theory this power of appeal
should ensure that substantive outcomes in administrative fora do
not differ markedly from those that would be achieved in a court.
However, this theory fails in practice. By and large, the courts have
deferred to the presumed superior expertise of the administrators
and have exercised their power of review with surprising timidity.
It is a rare case indeed when Commission action is enjoined by the
courts.64
B. The Different Balance of Corporate and Securities Law
in Canada and the United States
Both through the issuance of policy statements and their
wide ranging discretionary powers, Canadian securities regulators are
encroaching on the domain of corporate law at an ever more rapid
rate. For example, before Part XIX of the Ontario Securities Act
Corp. v. Genstar Corp. (1981), 125 D.L.R. (3d) 303 (Ont. H.C.) [hereinafter First City
Financia], in which the court refused to grant an injunction where the matter was also before
the O.S.C., on the ground that the Commission's ability to use the threat of invoking the cease
trade power enabled it to find a "middle ground" not available to a court. See infra, note 64.
63 See, eg., O..A., supra, note 56, s. 9(1).
64 See H.N. Janisch, "Reregulating the Regulator. Administrative Structure of Securities
Commissions and Ministerial Responsibility" in Special Lectures of the Law Society of Upper
Canada, 1989, supra, note 57 at 97. The deference shown securities regulators by the courts
is plain in First City Financial, supra, note 62. In an application for an injunction to restrain
the completion of a competing takeover bid, Reid J., in denying the application, indicated a
preference to defer to the superior expertise of the Securities Commission, commenting at
316:
It appears to me that the Commission has adequate jurisdiction and power to deal
with the issue of non-disclosure in the circumstances of this case. If that is not
found under s. 123 of the Act, then other sections may well be available, both to
create jurisdiction and to authorize action.
The Court noted that, by using the cease trade power, or by threatening to use the power,
the Commission could use its powers of "persuasion and suggestion" to fashion an appropriate
remedy - a "middle ground" not available to a court asked to grant an interim injunction. In
choosing to defer to the Commission, the Court also pointed to the speed, relative informality,
and superior expertise of the Commission. As a matter of practice, corporate and securities
practitioners will tend to go to the Commission before going to the courts, for precisely the
reasons indicated by Reid J. (in addition, of course to the fact that this may be the cheapest
way to secure redress).
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(dealing with takeover bids) was amended to include takeover bids
for non-voting classes of shares,65 the Commission purported to
achieve the same result through Commission Policy Statement 1.3,
which, like other o.s.c policies, entirely lacks juridical force.6 6 The
same policy statement purports to extend to holders of non-voting
(and restricted voting) shares the rights of voting shareholders to
receive notice of, to attend, and be heard at, company meetings,
although there is no such requirement in any applicable corporate
law.67 For over a decade, the Commission has also indicated in
Policy Statement 9.1 that it will require an independent valuation
and majority of the minority voting approval in order for a
corporation under its jurisdiction to consummate a going private
transaction, again even where there is no such requirement in
relevant corporate law.68 Most recently, the Commission has
extended the requirements of this policy statement to a variety of
other types of transactions.69 These are merely illustrative examples
of the manner in which securities regulators have recently moved
into the domain of corporate law.
The picture is somewhat different in the United States.
Although like its Canadian counterparts, the federal Securities and
Exchange Commission (s.E.c) has been given a wide variety of
discretionary powers,70 its power to order that trading in the
securities of an issuer shall cease is much more circumscribed than
the power given to Canadian regulators. 71 Moreover, the S.E.C.
65 R.S.O. 1980, c. 466, as am. S.O. 1987, c. 7, s. 8.
66 See O.S.C Policy 1.3, para. V.1.
6 7 bid. Part IV.
68 See O.S.C. Policy 9.1. Although a similar requirement may be found in the O.B.C.A,
supra, note 34, s. 189, the jurisdiction of the securities regulators extends to companies
incorporated in other provinces, if those companies have significant numbers of shareholders
in Ontario.
69 The proposed revisions to Policy 9.1 were adopted on 5 July 1991. See "Policy
Statement 9.1 - Disclosure, Valuation, Review and Approval Requirements and
Recommendations for Insider Bids, Issuer Bids, Going Private Transactions and Related Party
Transactions" (1991) 14 O.S.C.B. 3345. See infra, notes 174-87.
70 See The Puzkl of Shareholder Fiduciary Duties, supra, note 46.
71 Mid.
1991]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
possesses no counterpart to the power to deny trading exemptions.72
As a consequence, the discretionary power of federal regulators to
shape the market is much more limited than in Canada.
The fact that securities regulation in Canada is a provincial
matter, while it is largely a federal matter in the United States, may
be an important factor in explaining why Canadian securities
regulators generally wield a wider ambit of discretionary authority
than their American counterparts. Conflict of law rules dictate that
the corporation carries its charter with it wherever it goes, so that
disputes relating to the governing corporate law are determined
under the law of the chartering jurisdiction. Securities laws,
however, apply to all corporations with a material number of
shareholders in the regulating jurisdiction, wherever incorporated.
Securities law is thus the instrument of choice for provincial policy-
makers bent on expanding their control over corporate behaviour,
since all corporations that wish to play in the local jurisdiction's
backyard must abide by its home-grown rules.73 Indeed, because
securities regulators commonly take the view that out-of-province
transactions have a reflexive effect on local investors, they have
shown few qualms about purporting to extend their jurisdiction to
transactions taking place entirely in another jurisdiction.7 4
One of the most important consequences of the extent to
which Canadian securities regulators have begun to intrude on
matters that have traditionally fallen in the domain of corporation
law is that competitive corporate law innovation is likely to be
greatly stifled (if it has not been already). As the American
literature indicates, law can be thought of as a "product," with
corporations as '"buyers" of the product.75 In the United States, it
72 bid.
73 See, ag, M.J. Trebilcock et al., The Choice of Governing Instrument (Ottawa: Ministry
of Supply & Services, 1982).
74 See, eg, P.J. Dey, Opening Statement for Panel on Fxtraterritorial Application of
Securities Laws (Los Angeles: Law Institute of the Pacific Rim, 21 October 1983); In re
Connor (1976), O.S.C.B. 149; and In re Kaiser Resources Ltd (10 April 1981), 1 O.S.C.B. 13C.
75 See R. Romano, "Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle" (1985)
1 3. Law Econ. & Org. 225.
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is clear that states compete for incorporation business, which brings
in franchise fees and taxation revenues.
Although some have suggested that the competition for
chartering business operates to the disadvantage of the corporation's
shareholders and in favour of its managers, 76 the evidence now
suggests that this is not usually the case.77 The competition for
chartering business, in fact, appears to have produced superior
corporation laws. In Canada, although there has been some recent
chartering competition, it has failed to produce the elaborate
institutional regime that can be observed in the United States.
78
Although there may be a variety of factors responsible for less
vigorous competition (that is, the role of the Supreme Court,
inability to realize minimum efficient scale of production, enhanced
prospect of coordinated behaviour, legal market failures, and
geographic monopoly by central Canadian governments), the ability
of securities regulators to effectively nullify corporate law reforms by
imposing their own standards may be the most important factor.
79
The diversion of the function of corporate and securities law
adjudication to the administrators has another side-effect. Since
Canadian judges see relatively few corporate or securities law
disputes, few have acquired any degree of expertise in these areas.
The result is a generally low quality of judicial crafting of corporate
and securities law. This is in marked contrast to many of the state
courts. The Delaware courts in particular have evolved mechanisms
for expedited hearings, circulation of judgments for comment before
release, and a high level of judicial competence in cases involving
corporate litigants.
76 See, eg., W.L Cary, "Federal and Corporate Law. Reflections Upon Delaware" (1974)
83 Yale LJ. 663.
77 Romano, supra, note 75.
78 RJ. Daniels, "Should Provinces Compete: The Case for a Competitive Corporate Law
Market" (1991) 36 McGill LIJ. 130.
79 ibid.
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C. Summary
The regulatory parameters applicable in Canada differ
somewhat from those in the United States. More particularly,
securities regulators have a broader range of discretionary powers,
and have used these powers to move into the domain of corporate
law to a degree not witnessed in the United States. One
consequence of this development is that the success of provincial (or
federal) corporate law reforms is rendered problematic, given the
ability and demonstrated inclination of securities regulators to make
their own corporate law. These institutional parameters supply both
an important context and an important constraint against which
proposals for corporate law reform must be measured. Increasingly,
the attention of corporate law reformers must be focused on the
securities regulators, and their use of policy statements and
discretionary sanctions, rather than simply the corporation codes.
V. THE IMPACT OF DISTINCTIVENESS:
THREE CASE STUDIES
In this part, we apply the insights culled from the previous
discussion to three case studies: (1) the private agreement
exemption; (2) poison pills; and (3) a non-arms length transaction
between controlled corporations of the Bronfman group of
companies. Each of these will be examined in turn.
A. The Private Agreement Exemption in Canada
The role that the distinctive features of the structure of
Canadian markets and institutions can play in influencing the
content of the corporate and securities law regime is vividly
illustrated by the longstanding debate over the appropriate role of
the private agreement exemption from the requirements of the
takeover bid legislation. This issue, which has been addressed by a
number of governmental and non-governmental task forces over the
last two and a half decades, has once again been brought to the fore
by the recent proposal of the Canadian Securities Administrators to
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tighten the ambit of the exemption8 0 In our opinion, the decision
whether to tighten or, indeed, relax the private agreement
exemption should be based on a firm understanding of the costs and
benefits of the exemption in a Canadian setting. Although a
number of the analyses furnished to support changes to the
exemption have articulated a similar commitment, it is our opinion
that this commitment has been honoured more in its breach than in
its observance.
The private agreement exemption is simply a statutory safe-
harbour that, in the case of the Ontario Securities Act, exempts
offers to purchase shares from five or fewer shareholders at a price
not exceeding 115 per cent of a benchmark market price from the
rigours of the takeover rules81 These rules prescribe certain
minimum conditions for the consummation of a statutorily defined
takeover bid, that is, an offer to acquire voting or equity shares of
any class that would result in the offeror owning more than 20 per
cent of that class of shares. These conditions include: minimum
bid periods,8 2 early warning requirements that force acquirors to
disclose the acquisition of securities of a given class of shares once
certain ownership thresholds are reached,83 mandated disclosure of
material information respecting a takeover bid,84 pro rata take up of
shares when the number of securities tendered into a bid is greater
8 0 The C.S.A. proposal suggests a tightening of the existing regime by limiting to one the
number of times that the exemption can be relied on by a shareholder in respect of a given
class of securities and by imposing constraints on the length of time during which purchases
under the exemption can occur. According to the C.SA, the tightening is needed so that
inequalities in the treatment accorded institutional and individual security holders can be
mitigated. See Canadian Securities Administrators Take-over Bid Subcommittee, "Proposed
Changes to Provincial Securities Legislation - Take-Over Bids" (1990) 13 O.S.C.B. 2295.
81 The private agreement exemption may be found in O.3A, supra, note 56, s. 92(1)(c).
82 The minimum bid period under the Ontario Securities Act is twenty-one days. bid.
s. 94(2).
83 The Act requires that acquisition of 10 per cent of the voting or equity securities of
a company must be accompanied by the issuance of a press release, and within two business
days, a report to the Commission. Ibid. s. 100(1). Each additional acquisition of 2 per cent
must be accompanied by the issue of a press release, a copy of which must be filed with the
Commission. Ibid. s. 100(a)(2).
8 4 Ibid. s. 97(1).
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than the number sought by an acquiror,85 and withdrawal rights.86
Since these "rules of the road" have the effect of substantially
fettering the flexibility of both the purchasing and selling
shareholders in effecting control transfers, the ability to avoid their
application is of considerable economic value.
The current form of the private agreement exemption
reflects no single underlying rationale, but rather is a compromise
between those expressing contrary views about the ownership of any
premium paid to acquire control of the company. To some
commentators, of whom Berle and Means are the most prominent,
the ability to control the corporation is merely an incident of the
voting process.5 Under this theory, control is a corporate asset and
any premium paid for control must therefore be shared amongst all
shareholders. Other commentators who have objected to the
disproportionate sharing of the control premium have grounded their
arguments more directly in a simple principle of equality:88 that is,
whether a shareholder holds or participates in control or not,
equality of treatment must govern in any transfer of control.
Others, notably Easterbrook and Fischel, have championed
the view that unequal treatment of controlling and non-controlling
shareholders is unobjectionable and may indeed be a desideratum.89
Easterbrook and Fischel argue that shareholders will, er ante, choose
the rule that maximizes their expectation of future gain, and that a
rule that allows controlling shareholders to receive a
disproportionate share of any premium paid for parting with control
will accomplish this end. A fundamental assumption in the
argument is that transfers of control are generally beneficial to the
85 kbid. s. 94.7.
86Ibid. s. 94A.
8 7 AA Berle & G.C. Means, The Modem Corporation and Private Propetny, rev'd ed.
(New York. Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967). Other commentators arguing for the sharing
of a control premium on this ground include D.C. Bayne, "Corporate Control as a Strict
Trustee" (1965) 53 Geo. LJ. 543; D.C. Bayne, "The Sale of Corporate Control" (1965) 33
Fordham L Rev. 583; and R.W. Jennings, "Trading in Corporate Control" (1965) 44 Calif.
L Rev. 1.
88 W.D. Andrews, "The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares"
(1965) 78 Harv. L Rev. 505.
89 Corporate Control Transactions, supra, note 3.
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corporation, in that they tend to eliminate inefficient management
and move corporate assets to the hands of those who can direct
them most efficiently. Thus, even though shareholders may not
participate directly in a control premium (or may receive less than
a pro rata share of the premium) they will benefit indirectly to the
extent that the corporation is better run. In addition, allowing
controllers to keep a disproportionate share of the control premium
will increase the probability that a control transfer will occur.
Because controllers can reap a higher reward for selling control,
they will be more inclined to do so. Similarly, because the buyer
need not pay a premium to all shareholders, its cost of acquisition
will be lowered, and it will be more inclined to make the
acquisition.90
The argument in favour of allowing controllers to keep any
control premium may be buttressed by noting that, in the absence of
government intervention, control blocks of shares typically trade in
the market at a premium to the market price. This premium may
reflect in part the psychic benefit of being able to direct the
operations of the corporation. Some, like the late Harold Ballard,
clearly derive pleasure from the ability to control over and above
any financial reward that might result from ownership of a control
block. Others may derive advantage from being able to arrange the
manner in which profits are returned to shareholders in a manner
that minimizes their personal income taxes. So long as the source
of the control premium is non-objectionable, the ability of the seller
to capture a premium for sale of control reflects both the fact that
controlling and non-controlling shares are not in fact fungible, and
the fact that the controller itself will have paid a premium to
acquire control.91 The imposition of a level price rule in these
90 As against this, one might argue that in cases in which the law mandates that the
premium be split between all shareholders equally, or in cases where the law requires that an
offer be made to all shareholders on equal terms, the seller might simply divide the control
premium that it had anticipated paying between all shareholders, resulting in no increase in
acquisition cost. However, while this might indeed be the case, in such cases the controlling
seller will be less likely to sell, diminishing the probability that a takeover bid will succeed.
91 In perhaps a more sinister vein, controllers may sometimes derive benefit from
diverting corporate assets to their own use, whether through excessive managerial salaries,
consumption of perquisites, arranging interested transactions, or other means. If this is the
case, then the argument for allowing holders of control to capture a premium for its sale is
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circumstances would confer windfall gains on non-controlling
shareholders, without any ethical support or efficiency gains.
To a large extent, the evolution of the private agreement
exemption is a consequence of the different weight that policy-
makers have accorded to each of these arguments. Initially, in
Ontario, the greatest weight appears to have been attached to the
view that corporate control is a personal and not a corporate asset.
This view is implicit in the report of the Kimber Committee,92
whose recommendations resulted in the The Securities Act, 1966 and
the first comprehensive set of takeover rules in Ontario. The
Committee recommended that transfers of control effected by way
of private agreement be exempted from the ambit of the proposed
takeover legislation.93 Strictly speaking, the Committee's exclusion
of privately effected control transfers from the takeover legislation
was not meant to be an endorsement of any of the competing
visions of the status of the control premium. Rather, the
Committee felt that the duty to share a control premium was
essentially a fiduciary duty, whose evolution was best left to the
courts.9
4
Barely five years after the report of the Kimber Committee,
the appropriate distribution of the control premium was examined
once again in the Ontario Securities Commission's Merger Study.95
Although the Merger Committee was sensitive to the plight of
minority shareholders who "find themselves at a loss, because of the
competing claims or atmosphere of uncertainty, to know the best
clearly weakened.
92 Ontario, Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Securities Legislation in Ontario
(Toronto: Government of Ontario, 1965) (Chair J.R. Kimber) [hereinafter Kimber Report].
93 iMd. para. 3.12.
94 Ibid. In the words of the Committee:
We are of the opinion that the evolution of a legal doctrine which may impose upon
directors or other insiders of a company who constitute a control group a fiduciary
duty toward other shareholders of such company in cases of control is, apart from
insider trading aspects, a matter to be left to development by the judicial process.
95 Ontario Securities Commission, Report of the Committee of the Ontario Securities
CommLission on the Problems of Disclosure Raised for Investors by Business Combinations and
Private Placements (Toronto: The Commission, 1970).
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course to follow" during the course of a takeover bid,96 it refrained
from recommending "the easiest and least flexible solution, to
prohibit all 'exempt offers,' requiring all acquisitions to be made
through circulars and all offers to be made pro rata to all
shareholders."97 The basis for the Merger Committee's reluctance
was rooted in the efficiency concerns standing at the heart of the
Chicago School's enthusiasm for unequal sharing. In the view of the
Committee, subjecting private transfers of control to the takeover
bid regime would
reduce incentive to a common denominator, including the incentive to control,
manage, build and then divest to take the benefit of those efforts. The solution
providing equality is simple. The result of the solution would be profound.
8
The Committee also noted that there was no evidence that control
persons had so abused their positions as to require special treatment
and echoed the Kimber Committee's recommendation that the issue
of fairness as between shareholders be remitted to the courts.
Accordingly, in their view, the private agreement exemption should
be left undisturbed.
By the time that the Select Committee of the Ontario
Legislature addressed the issue three years later,99 momentum in
favour of a more confined role for the private agreement exemption
appeared to be gathering force. Despite this and over the strong
reservations of the minority and a change of heart by the o.s.c., the
Select Committee continued to support a wide ambit for the private
agreement exemption. While the majority reiterated the efficiency
concerns expressed by Merger Committee, the minority report called
for the introduction of a requirement that a private purchase of
control would be followed up by an offer on the same terms to all
other shareholders. In stark contrast to the views of the majority,
the minority wholeheartedly embraced the notion of control as a
9 6 Aid. para. 7.03.
97 Ibid. para. 7.04.
98 bid.
99 Select Committee on Company Law, 1973 Report on Merger Amalgamations and
Certain Related Matters (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1973) (Chair. William Hodgson).
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corporate asset and the fungibility of shares of the same class 10
With respect to the majority's argument that an equal price regime
would endanger entrepreneurial incentives, the minority simply
asserted that this argument was "not as strong as it appears. '101
At the end of the day, however, it was the minority, and not
the majority that prevailed. Following the Select Committee's
report, a number of bills were introduced in the legislature that
sought to modify the private agreement exemption. One of the
earliest of these initiatives, Bill 98 (which would have resulted in
The Securities Act, 1975) envisaged the removal of the private
agreement exemption by requiring all offers to be made to all
Ontario security holders on the same terms, irrespective of whether
or not the acquiror sought to pay a control premium to a controlling
shareholder. 10 2  After this Bill failed, the legislature ultimately
adopted a compromise position which permitted the retention of the
private agreement exemption, subject to an obligation to make a
"follow-up" offer to non-controlling shareholders, as the minority of
the Select Committee had recommended 0 3 Under this provision' °4
100 As the minority report put it:
Conceptually, at least, each share in the capital of a company is the same as every
other share of the same class and entitles the holder to an aliquot interest in the
company. When a controlling shareholder sells control, the thing he is really selling
is corporate assets and the right to control the use of those assets and those assets
belong to all of the shareholders, not merely the controller.
IbMd. at 31.
101 Ibid.
102 This prompted Peter Dey to suggest that the
Government has been almost too rigorous in its attempt to eliminate the payment
of control premiums ... Under Bill 98, the acquisition of a company by way of a
share offer will be a very expensive proposition. Fewer companies will be able to
master the resources to undertake the payment of a premium for control and the
extension of an offer upon similar terms to the balance of target company
shareholders.
See P. Dey, "Securities Reform in Ontario: The Securities Act, 1975" (1975-76) 1 Can. Bus.
L.J. 20 at 38. For an excellent chronology and discussion of the various stages of legislation
introduced respecting the private agreement exemption, see B. Bailey & P. Crawford, "The
Takeover Bid by Private Agreement: The Follow Up Offer Obligation" (1983) 7 Dal. L.J. 93.
103 As indicated by Bailey & Crawford, ibid at 116, the legislation was a
compromise between those advocating minority shareholder protection and those
advocating an improvement of the integrity of the capital markets without placing
undue restrictions on the entrepreneur when dealing in the public marketplace.
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(as modified by the regulations105), control might be purchased from
fewer than fifteen persons at a premium to market of less than 115
per cent without triggering a follow up obligation. Any private
purchase of control from fifteen or more persons or in excess of
the stated premium triggered an obligation to make an offer for
equivalent consideration to other shareholders within a year.
The follow-up offer provision was relatively short-lived. In
the wake of sustained criticism, members of the corporate bar (the
Practitioner Committee106) and the securities industry (the Industry
Committee1 T) were invited to comment to the o.s.c. on possible
amendment of the provision. Apart from the similarity of their
recommendations, one of the most striking features of the two
reports is their rejection of efficiency concerns in favour of an
unqualified adoption of the concept of substantive equality among
all shareholders of the corporation, irrespective of controlling or
non-controlling status. The Practitioner Report, for example, stated:
we believe that shareholders of an offeree issuer and public investors generally
should be confident that transactions which may affect the de facto control of public
security issuers will be made, as a matter of principle, on a basis which requires
identical treatment of holders of the same class of securities and that all such
shareholders will have an equal opportunity to participate in the benefits which may
accompany a change of effective control of issuers.
1 08
Embracing what it viewed as changing commerical mores, the
Industry Report also recommended the adoption of an equal price
rule, rejecting the notion that the control premium was private
property. What was a minority view, just a decade earlier, had now
become the received wisdom in the financial community.
104 See The Securities Act 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 91(1).
105 Formerly R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 910, s. 163(3).
106 Ontario Securities Commission, Report of the Committee to Review the Provisions of
The Securities Act (Ontario) Relating to Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids (Toronto: The
Commission, 1983) [hereinafter Practitioner Report].
107 Securities Industry Committee on Take-over Bids, The Regulation of Take-Over Bids
in Canada: Premium Private Agreement Transactions: Report of the Securities Industiy
Committee on Take-over Bids (Ottawa: The Committee, 1983) (Chair P. Lortie) [hereinafter
Industry Report].
108 Practitioner Report, supra, note 106 at 1.
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The two committees also noted that the follow-up offer as
then structured frequently required the Commission to make the
difficult determination of whether a follow-up offer was for
"equivalent" consideration. Further, as the follow-up offer could
take place up to a year after the initial exempt purchase of control,
market conditions may have changed dramatically, possibly making
it difficult for the offeror to comply with its obligation.109
Despite these criticisms, the committees did not recommend
the complete abandonment of the private agreement exemption.
Rather, the committees recommended that the follow up offer
obligation be jettisoned in favour of an approach derived from
Quebec securities legislation, under which an offer made to more
than five persons or in excess of a 115 per cent premium to market
would be a non-exempt "takeover bid," requiring full and immediate
compliance with the provisions of the Act relating to takeover
bids. °10 This recommendation eventually became law.!
In a review of the evolution of the private agreement
exemption, the absence of facts is astonishing. The fundamental
purpose of securities regulation is the promotion of the interests of
investors. Many of the theoretical arguments either in favour of or
against the narrowing private agreement exemption have empirically
testable implications for the welfare of investors. And yet, in the
history that we have reviewed, no attempt has been made to seek
out or commission any empirical investigations of the effect of
narrowing the scope of the private agreement exemption on
Canadian capital markets.
Those who have participated in the policy process have made
reference to the various theoretical arguments that we have
canvassed above, though much of the debate has proceeded without
a keen sensitivity to what is, in fact, distinctive about the Canadian
context and how this might impact on policy. Virtually every report,
from that of the Kimber Committee to those of the corporate bar
and securities industry, has grappled at an abstract level with the
109 Both of these difficulties are apparent in In re Turbo Resources Ltd and Bankeno
Mines Ltd (5 November 1982), 4 O.S.C.B. 403C.
110 Securides Act, S.Q. 1982, c. 48, s. 116, as am. S.0. 1984, c. 41, s. 40.
111 In the current legislation, see 0S.A., supra, note 56, s. 92(1)(c).
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possibility that the structure of the Canadian economy could render
solutions transported from other contexts less applicable to
Canada.1 2 Nevertheless, this recognition has seldom (if ever) been
followed up by a concrete analysis of the nature of Canadian
distinctiveness and its consequences, rendering the appeal to
Canadian distinctiveness more rhetorical than real.
The Industry Report, for example, blithely dismissed the
efficiency concerns implicated by an equal price regime in the
following terms:
The Easterbrook-Fischel proposition is that the fiduciary obligation is notper se to
ensure that benefits arising from transactions are all shared equally or 'fairly'.
Rather, the fiduciary should maximize wealth and then follow the agreed rules for
distribution of benefits ... They justify their approach with their assumption that
shareholders unanimously prefer legal rules under which the amount of gains is
maximized, regardless of how gains are distributed. Evidence in the Canadian
capital market invalidates this assmption.
1 1 3
Unfortunately, the evidence relied on by the authors of the Industry
Report is not presented.
Not all of the theoretical arguments regarding the disposition
of a control premium are empirically testable. For example, the
view that all shareholders have an ethical or moral entitlement to
share equally in any premium is obviously not subject to empirical
verification. However, even for those who prefer a moral argument
(based, for example, on the principle of "equality" as an end in
itself) to an efficiency argument, the economic costs of imposing a
particular regime of rules must surely be relevant. And there are
indeed a variety of ways in which the comparative costs of different
regimes of rules may be illuminated. To begin, it is important to
know how many private transfers of control have taken place both
before and after changes in the regulatory regime restricting private
transfers of control. Equally, it is important to know how target
112 For instance, the Knber Report, supra, note 92 at 20, para. 3.03 noted that the
existing structure of the financial community in Ontario and in Canada at large
differs from that of other jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom ... While the
legislation and studies in other jurisdictions have been examined by the Committee,
we have remained cognizant of the fact that any recommendations which we make
should related to the commercial and financial circumstances which prevail in
Canada and not elsewhere.
113 Industry Report, supra, note 107 at 29 (emphasis added).
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shareholders (and acquiror shareholders 14) fare when there is a
private agreement transferring control of the corporation. Well
recognized statistical and econometric techniques can help determine
if any changes in the frequency of, or gains resulting from such
transactions, are a product of changes in the regulatory environment.
The results of investigations of this nature would take policy-making
out of a vacuum and situate it in a factual environment against
which the costs and benefits of different forms of regulatory
interventions could be measured. For example, evidence that private
changes in control generate net gains for acquiror and target
shareholders or that the frequency of private changes in control has
decreased dramatically since the introduction of the restrictions on
private changes in control, might do much to strengthen the case
against restricting the private sale of control.
There is other evidence which might help illuminate the
utility of the private agreement exemption. For example, if the
progressive tightening of the exemption has resulted in fewer private
changes of control, has it also resulted in proportionately more
changes of control being effected by offers made to shareholders
generally? How do the gains of shareholders of both target and
acquiror companies in takeover bids compare to the gains to
shareholders where there are private changes in control?
More generally, what are the sources of gains in acquisition
activity? Private gains of shareholders might be funded, for
example, by transfers of wealth from bondholders or employees to
shareholders, from increasing monopolization of the markets in
which the acquiror and target sell their products or sharply reduced
tax burden. If so, then private gains may mask net social costs.
This might have a profound effect on takeover policy (and not
merely the private agreement exemption). On the other hand,
private gains may arise from elimination of inefficient management,
from transaction synergies, or from other sources of efficiency
improvements, and result in net increases in societal wealth.
Restricting the scope of the exemption is likely to force
acquirors seeking control to resort more frequently to general offers
114 And indeed, the other constituents of both acquiror and target corporations, like
bond holders, employees, et cetera.
[voL. 29 No. 4
Canadian Corporate Law
to shareholders. This, in turn, is likely in many cases to increase the
capital needed to effectuate a takeover bid. Thus, it would be
useful to know how efficiently Canadian debt markets work in
funding acquisition activity. Evidence of a weakness in funding
acquisition programmes might be further evidence against a narrow
private agreement exemption, while evidence of robust debt markets
might cut in the other direction.
A further issue that invites empirical investigation (and one
that has been largely neglected by Canadian commentators). is the
extent to which Canadian takeover policy has been diverted toward
the pursuit of the wrong target. From the Kimber Committee
onwards, the primary goal of takeover policy has been the protection
of the interests of target shareholders. 115 And yet, to the extent
that target shareholders are enriched by the takeover rules, acquiring
shareholders are impoverished. This pure redistribution of wealth
has no efficiency consequences and seems rather pointless. But let
us suppose that for some reason target shareholders are to be seen
as more deserving than acquiror shareholders. Are the same people
in fact systematically likely to be target shareholders? Or might they
sometimes be target shareholders and sometimes acquiror
shareholders? The question is important. Most shareholders hold
portfolios of securities, either by constructing such portfolios
themselves or investing their funds through financial intermediaries
(banks, insurance and trust companies, mutual funds, et cetera) which
hold large portfolios. If these shareholders are just as likely to be
acquiror shareholders as target shareholders in respect of a given
acquisition, then the argument that target shareholders are more
deserving than acquiror shareholders seems to fall to the ground.
After all, those who are target shareholders in one acquisition are
likely to be acquiror shareholders in the next. Over the long haul,
the policy of favouring target shareholders will therefore have no
distributional impact.
One might argue that in these circumstances the policy of
favouring target shareholders at least does no harm. But this is not
quite accurate. First, the restrictive takeover rules reduce the
number of takeover bids and therefore the level of management
115 Kimber Report, supra, note 92 at 22, para. 3.10.
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discipline, decreasing the overall efficiency of Canadian enterprise.
Second, compliance with the rules creates large legal, accounting,
and planning costs. If the distributional goal of favouring target
shareholders is illusory, the underlying rationale for our current
takeover rules is in serious jeopardy.
The empirical issue for verification is therefore the extent to
which there is a discrete class of "target" shareholders who are not
also likely to be acquiror shareholders. Does the typical Canadian
portfolio contain representatives of both classes of corporation or
more of one class than another? Many of the largest Canadian
companies are owned by public upstream holding companies - like
B.C.E., Canadian Pacific, Hees, Edper Enterprises, and Power
Financial - that afford institutional and retail investors alike the
opportunity to directly participate in the benefits arising from a
control transfer (to the extent that these flow to the acquiror).
B. The Case of Poison Pills
Since late 1988, when Inco first introduced the poison pill to
Canadian capital markets, approximately twenty-four Canadian
companies have adopted or have announced their intention to adopt
poison pills.116  Most of these companies are "management
controlled" public companies lacking a controlling shareholder.
The introduction of the poison pill by widely held public
companies is a disturbing development. Although there is as yet
almost no systematic empirical evidence that would shed light on
how shareholders of Canadian poison pill companies fare, there is a
large body of empirical evidence from the United States (where
poison pills made their debut in late 1982) that suggests that poison
pills are not in the best interests of shareholders, but serve to
protect managers against loss of employment as a result of a hostile
takeover bid. Three American studies conclude that, on average,
share prices decline on the announcement, of the intended adoption
116 See J.G. Macintosh, "Poison Pills in Canada: A Reply to Dey and Yalden" (1991)
17 Can. Bus. L.J. 323.
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of a poison pill.1'7 Companies that adopt poison pills appear to be
more poorly run than their industry cohorts.118  Moreover, judicial
decisions upholding a managerial decision not to redeem a poison
pill - that is, a decision to defeat a hostile bid - result on average
in share price declines for target companies, while decisions ordering
poison pill redemption cause share prices, on average, to rise.
119
Other evidence suggests that poison pills are not in the best
interests of shareholders! 20 There is only a single Canadian study
21
which, though ambiguous in its result, it is not materially inconsistent
with the American studies.1 22
In the United States, neither corporate nor securites law
require that a poison pill be approved by shareholders.1 23 In fact,
poison pills appear to have become popular with widely held public
corporations in the United States for precisely this reason. Other
"shark repellent" techniques, like fair price charter amendments,
staggered boards, managerial authority to issue blank cheque
preferred shares, and similar devices require shareholder approval.
In the face of increasing inability to convince institutional
shareholders to vote in favour of shark repellent amendments,
American managers have opted for a technique that by-passes
shareholder approval entirely. Thus, in the United States, the
poison pill has become a potent tool for circumventing institutional
shareholder oversight of management.
124
117 P.H. Malatesta & R.A. Walkling, "Poison Pill Securities: Stockholder Wealth,
Profitability and Ownership Structure" (1988) 20 J. Fin. Econ. 347; M. Ryngaert, "The Effect
of Poison Pill Securities on Shareholder Wealth" (1988) 20 J. Fim. Econ. 377; and Office of
the Chief Economist, Securities and Exchange Commission, The Effects of Poison Pills on the
Wealth of Target Shareholders (Washington: Securities and Exchange Commission, 1986).
118 See J.G. MacIntosh, 'The Poison Pill: A Noxious Nostrum for Canadian
Shareholders" (1989) 18 Can. Bus. LJ. 276 at 288-89.
119 Ibid. at 287-88.
120 ibid. See also MacIntosh, supra, note 116.
121 P. Halpern, "Poison Pills: Whose Interests Do They Serve?" (1990) 3(1) Can. Inv't
Rev. 57.
122 See Macintosh, supra, note 116, n. 13-14 and accompanying text.
123 See MacIntosh, supra, note 118 at 277.
124 bid.
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In Canada, securities regulators and stock exchanges now
require shareholder approval of poison pills as a matter of course 25
Moreover, the "permitted bid" form of poison pill is crafted to
nominally leave the decision of whether to approve a permitted bid
in the hands of shareholders. 126 On the face of it, Canadian poison
pills thus appear to do little violence to the principle that
shareholders are the ultimate arbiters of the fate of the corporation.
And indeed, no majority of Canadian shareholders has yet turned
down management's request to approve a poison pill.
The fact that Canadian shareholders routinely approve
measures that operate against their best interests is a puzzle with
important implications for the analysis of corporate governance in
Canada. Many of the corporations that have adopted poison pills
have significant institutional shareholdings.1 27 We believe that the
case of poison pills is a cautionary tale that emphasizes both the
strengths and weaknesses of the capital market discipline exercised
by institutional shareholders in Canada.
Looking first to the strengths of institutional involvement in
the marketplace, institutional shareholders and their advisors have
been the primary source of criticism of management, bringing to
bear a degree of experience, expertise, and market acumen not
shared by the average retail investor. Amongst institutional
shareholders, the Caisse de Ddp6t et Placement du Qudbec has been
particularly active in campaigning against poison pills.128  The
Allenvest Group Inc., an advisor to institutional shareholders, has
also been vigorous in its opposition to the poison pill.129
125 However, such approval requirements have not yet been formalized.
126 See Allenvest Group Limited, "Summary of Current Poison Pill Plans" (1990) 2(3)
Corp. Gov. Rev. 2 [hereinafter Summay]; P. Anisman, "An Acceptable Poison Pill Rights
Plan?" (1990) 2(2) Corp. Gov. Rev. 2 [hereinafter An Acceptable Plan?]; and P. Anisman,
"Poison Pill Rights Plans: A Checklist of Issues" (1990) 2(3) Corp. Gov. Rev. 4 [hereinafter
Checklist].
-127 We do not have figures on institutional shareholdings in pill adopting firms and must
therefore rely on anecdotal accounts in the press. See, ag., MacIntosh, supra, note 118 at
305-11 (adoption of a poison pill by Inco Ltd).
128 The Caisse was particularly involved in the Inco compaign. Ibid.
129 See Summary, supra, note 126; Checklist, supra, note 126; and An Acceptable Plan?,
supra, note 126.
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Representations made by Allenvest Group Inc. have been pivotal in
convincing some Canadian companies to alter some of the provisions
of their poison pills.130 As a result of institutional opposition, many
shareholder votes approving poison pills have been perilously close
to failing, in sharp contrast to the usual nearly unanimous
endorsement of management initiatives 31  Thus, institutional
shareholders have played a key role in shaping the debate about
poison pills.
Equally important in emphasizing the vanguard role of
institutional shareholders is the fact that retail investors have been
characteristically mute on the issue of poison pills. This is not
surprising. Retail investors are not protected by any organization
that represents their interests. They have no spokespersons.
Indeed, by nature, the retail investor is something of a wallflower,
watching the action from a distance and hoping for good fortune.
This simply emphasizes the point that we made earlier: collective
action problems prevent small investors from protecting their own
interests. Larger block holders, like institutional shareholders, play
a vital role in disciplining corporate management and keeping capital
markets on track. This is a role that cannot be replicated by small
shareholders.
And yet, despite the institutional opposition that has
emerged to poison pills, the fact remains that no poison pill has yet
been defeated. In our view, this highlights the weaknesses of
institional oversight of the market. In the face of potent evidence
from the United States that poison pills do not operate in the best
interests of shareholders, institutional shareholders have voted in
favour of poison pills in sufficient numbers to ensure that all
130 See W.S. Allen, "Post Pillage" (1990) 2(5) Corp. Gov. Rev. 1.
131 The total percentage of shareholders voting on the resolution to adopt a poison pill
and the percentage of those shareholders voting against the resolution are shown in brackets
(for those companies that, at the date of writing, have taken a vote): Pegasus Gold (50 per
cent, 16 per tent); Moore Corp. (66 per cent, 42 per cent); Sherrit Gordon (42 per cent, 47
per cent); Alcan Canada (68 per cent, 46 per cent); Ipsco (46 per cent, 16 per cent); Dofasco
(68 per cent, 31 per cent); Nowsco (43 per cent, 2 per cent); Finning (42 per cent, 3 per
cent); Canadian Pacific (53 per cent, 42 per cent); Southam (87 per cent, 37 per cent);
Federal Ind. (68 per cent, 36 per cent); Placer Dome (56 per cent, 43 per cent); Computalog
(58 per cent, 16 per cent); Loewen Group (56 per cent, 6 per cent); Franco Nevada (64 per
cent, 7 per cent); United Coin (53 per cent, 13 per cent); and CAE (40 per cent, 8 per cent).
See Allen, ibid.
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Canadian pills presented to shareholders have been adoptedt1 3 2
Why have some institutions voted in favour of the adoption of
poison pills?
One answer, of course, is that some percentage of
institutional investors simply believe management's representations
that the poison pill will operate in the best interests of shareholders.
Although we believe that the evidence is robust in suggesting that
poison pills are not in the best interests of shareholders, we do not
suggest that no rational person could adopt a different view. 33 Our
experience, however, convinces us that many institutional
shareholders voting in favour of poison pills were simply ignorant of
the United States evidence showing that shareholders, on average,
suffer when a poison pill is adopted. This demonstrates the first
limitation to institutional shareholder oversight of capital markets.
Institutional oversight is effective only to the extent that institutional
shareholders adequately inform themselves on matters that bear
upon their decision of how to vote. Although institutional investors
possess greater expertise than the average retail investor, an
uninformed institutional decision is not much more effective than
the uninformed decision of a relatively unsophisticated retail
investor.
We conjecture that it is easier for corporate management in
Canada to secure adoption of wealth-decreasing measures in part
because Canadian institutional investors are less likely to be well
informed than their American counterparts. This is a consequence
of the fact that our relatively small capital market does not generate
the depth of experience that a larger market necessarily will. In a
large market, fund managers will have greater access to both
anecdotal and systematic evidence about the likely effects of the
adoption of measures like poison pills. In relation to the former,
managers of institutional funds in a large market will have a wealth
of collective experience to draw upon in evaluating management
initiatives. In relation to the latter, a large market begets large data
132 We do not have a precise breakdown showing how institutional shareholders voted.
However, it seems clear, in at least some cases (for example, Inco) that had institutional
shareholders all voted against the poison pill, it would have failed.
133 See Macintosh, supra, note 118 at 312-21.
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samples, which furnish generous raw material with which to conduct
statistical studies. A large data sample reduces statistical "noise" and
generates a meaningful picture of what happens to share prices on
the adoption of various management initiatives. The American
experience is illustrative. In the United States, there is a rich
empirical academic literature which fund managers may consult in
the interests of better informing their decisions as to how to vote on
various management initiatives. And, whether as a consequence of
fund managers' own experiences in the market, or the availability of
systematic empirical evidence, or both, there is evidence that
American institutional shareholders have played an important role in
opposing wealth-decreasing corporate initiatives1 3 4
By contrast, the collective experience of Canadian
institutional investors with various forms of management initiatives
is likely to be impoverished, given the much smaller size of our
market and the relative infrequency of many types of corporate
events. Similarly, there is a paucity of systematic empirical evidence
bearing on the consequences for investors of various types of
corporate transactions. One looks in vain, for example, for
Canadian studies on the effects on share prices of managerial
resistance to a hostile takeover bid.135 To a large extent, this is due
to the unavailability of basic data sets in Canada. While data for
conducting American research is readily available from a number of
commercial sources,1 36 data sets in Canada are rudimentary or non-
existent.1 37
Despite the unavailability of Canadian empirical evidence, we
are surprised at the degree to which Canadian institutional
shareholders and fund managers are unencumbered by even a
134
See, eg., Brickley, Lease, & Smith, Jr., supra, note 45.
135 The paucity of Canadian evidence, in contrast to the richness of the American
literature, is illustrated by the discussion in Macintosh, supra, note 116, n. 13 and
accompanying text.
136 For example, the Center for Research on Securities Prices (C.R.S.P.) at the
University of Chicago.
137 Data collected for commercial sale is subject to substantial economies of scale, since
marginal sale costs are trivial compared to the fixed cost of initial data collection. This makes
data collection for commercial dissemination much more attractive in the large American
market than in the much smaller Canadian market.
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passing familiarity with the American literature. Similarities between
the two countries are sufficient that tilling this fertile ground would
greatly enhance the quality of decisions made by Canadian
institutional investors and fund managers and result in more
effective policing of corporate management. In particular, we
suggest that a greater familiarity with the corpus of American
evidence would result in the defeat by shareholders of not a few
poison pill plans.
A less easily remedied defect in the mechanism of
institutional shareholder oversight of capital markets is institutional
shareholder co-option by corporate management. Sometimes
institutional shareholders will conduct business with a corporation
seeking to adopt a poison pill or will be seeking future business
from such a corporation. Where this is the case, corporate
management can threaten to direct present or future business away
from a shareholder who votes against the poison pill or other
management sponsored initiatives. In fact, it is probable that no
explicit threat is necessary particularly where present or possible
future business ties are highly lucrative, institutional investors will
not be anxious to bite the hand that feeds them. Profits from a
direct trading relationship might easily exceed losses sustained by the
adoption of a wealth-reducing management initiative, the burden of
which is shared by all shareholders. One can imagine that this
creates a potent inducement for institutional investors to vote
routinely with management.
Many, or perhaps even most, institutional shareholders may
fear reprisals from voting against management. Banks may fear loss
of deposit or lending business. Trust companies may fear loss of
pension or fund management fees, or the withdrawal of the personal
trust plans of senior management. Insurance companies may fear
the cancellation of lucrative insurance coverage, whether it be
corporate asset or liability coverage, D & o insurance, or other forms
of insurance underwriting.
The problem of institutional co-option is more serious in
Canada than in the United States. Where the corporation is a link
in a larger corporate empire, an institutional investor opposing a
management initiative may fear the loss of business from all of the
corporations in the affiliated group. The fact that many
corporations in such affiliated groups will have a controlling
[VOL. 29 NO. 4
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shareholder may appear to render institutional activism irrelevant in
any case 38 However, even in such cases, institututions have a vital
role to play both as critics of management, and, in more extreme
cases, as plaintiffs. Management pressure may prevent them from
effectively serving either of these roles.
These disturbing influences were present in the contest
ultimately leading to the adoption of the first poison pill in Canada
by Inco Ltd. Although institutional investors understandably were
reluctant to air their grievances, newspaper accounts at the time
indicated that at least some institutions felt unduly pressured by
management to vote in favour of the proposed poison pil 3 9 The
reluctance that some industry participants felt to let their views on
the poison pill be publicly known are amply illustrated by an account
in the Globe and Mail of a meeting of the Mining Analysts
Association of Ontario! 40  When the time came to take a vote on
whether or not to support the Inco poison pill, it was reported that
the analysts were unanimously against adoption. However, one
analyst in attendance was persuaded to vote in favour of the poison
pill, and only the final tally of votes reported. This was allegedly
done so that each analyst in attendance could claim to have been
the one who supported the pois6ii pill.
One way to greatly ameliorate the problem of institutional
co-option is to mandate confidential voting. Where management
cannot determine how institutional or other shareholders have voted
on a resolution, shareholders need not fear reprisals from
management should they vote against a management initiative.1 41
Allenvest Group Inc. has recently sponsored the first shareholder
138 Where there is a "controller," institutional shareholders may nonetheless possess a
power of "negative control" if they are collectively able to defeat a special resolution requiring
the approval of two-thirds of those shareholders voting. Thus, the existence of de facto or
even de jure controlling shareholder does not automatically mean that the votes of institutional
shareholders or other large blockholders are meaningless.
139 See MacIntosh, supra, note 118 at 305-11, especially n. 151.
140 1 McNish, "Analysts Fire Shot at Inco Proposal" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (20
October 1988) Bi.
141 Where there are a very few large blockholders, management may be able to infer
from the vote count how particular investors voted. However, this will likely be an exceptional
case.
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initiative in Canada in favour of confidential voting, in asking Inco
shareholders to approve such a measure.142 Although an affirmative
vote on this proposal cannot as easily be interpreted as a
repudiation of management as a vote against a specific management
initiative, we anticipate that much management pressure will be
brought to bear on institutional shareholders to vote against this
proposal. In all likelihood, it will fail.
The provincial legislatures ought to give very serious
consideration to the passage of legislation that mandates confidential
voting for public corporations. Such legislation may be a crucial
step towards ensuring that institutional oversight of the market is
truly effective and would redound to the benefit of all shareholders.
As indicated earlier, consideration ought also to be given to
removing constraints that impede the ability of institutional investors
to police corporate management. For example, allowing banks to
own a controlling equity position would enable bank managers to
play an active, rather than merely a passive role in overseeing bank
investments 43 This would convert a huge pool of now passive
investment capital into active capital, bumping up a notch the
degree of discipline exerted over corporate managers.
In sum, the events surrounding the introduction of poison
pills in Canada demonstrate both the value and limitations of
institutional involvement in the marketplace. Institutional investors
play an invaluable role in policing corporate managers, but one that
is currently subject to both market and legal constraints. We are
convinced that there are changes in the legal environment that will
make institutional shareholders more active and more effective
players in Canadian capital markets. These are changes that can be
easily and quicldy implemented, and we urge legislators and
142 See Allenvest Group Limited, "Confidential Voting" (1990) 2(4) Corp. Gov. Rev. 1.
143 Section 193(2) of the Bank Act, supra, note 28 prohibits a bank from owning a
Canadian corporation's shares whose attached voting rights would permit the bank to vote
more than 10 per cent of the total votes attached to all issued and outstanding shares. In
addition, section 110(11) of the Act, prohibits any person or group of associated persons from
legally owning or beneficially owning more than 10 per cent of the issued and outstanding
shares of any particular class of the bank's shares. This latter limitation ought also to be
removed, in order that the bank managers are themselves held accountable both by large
blockholders and by the threat of a hostile takeover.
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securities regulators to give their serious attention to the role of
institutional players and how to enhance this role.
C. The Westfield Minerals Saga and O.S.C. Policy 9.1
The Westfield Minerals saga is illustrative both of the
conflicts of interest that can be generated in a market dominated by
extended corporate empires and the dangers such conflicts pose for
minority interests. It also illustrates the consequences of the
absence of institutional interests in the "second market," as well as
the uses and limits of independent valuations and approval by an
independent committee of directors.
Prior to the end of February 1989, Westfield Minerals Ltd.
was controlled by an Australian mining concern 44 At the end of
February, the Australian company agreed to sell its interest in
Westfield to American Resource Corp. Ltd. of Bermuda. American
Resource was a 96 per cent owned subsidiary of Canadian Express
Ltd., which itself was a wholly owned subsidiary of International
Pagurian Corp.145 Pagurian Corp. was, in turn, controlled jointly by
Christopher Ondaatje and Hees International Bancorp Inc., the
merchant banking arm of the Edward and Peter Bronfman empire.
By this circuitous route, the sale thus effectively transferred control
of Westfield into the hands of the Bronfman empire of companies.
Westfield's "crown jewel" was a 35 per cent interest in a
Chilean gold and silver mine known as Choquelimpie! 46 By mid-
1989, the mine was fully on-stream and producing gold at an annual
rate of about 100,000 ounces and silver at an annual rate of about
500,000 ounces.1 47 Ore reserves in the main deposit were 7.7
144 Reveltek controlled Westfield by virtue of a 45.6 per cent shareholding interest.
Reveltek, in turn, was controlled by Whim Creek Consolidated of Australia. See
"Northgate/Westfield Sells 15% Stake in Whimcreek" Northern Miner (27 February 1989) 15.
145 Ibid.
146 The other partners in the venture were Shell Chile (42 per cent) and Citibank N.A.
(23 percent). See "Flees Group to Keep Westfield Busy" Northern Miner (29 May 1989) 13.
The Northern Miner also indicated the extent of Westfield's other assets.
147 "Westfield Progressing With Choquelimpie Mine in Chile" Northern Miner (28 August
1989) 6 [hereinafter Choquelimpie].
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million tons, producing 0.058 ounces of gold per ton and 1.75
ounces of silver at the end of May 1989. It was expected that
exploratory drilling would uncover further reserves.148
The Westfield controversy stemmed from a decision of the
Westfield board, announced on 3 November 1989, to sell all of
Westfield's mining assets, including the interest in the Choquelimpie
mine, to another company in the Hees/Bronfman empire, Northgate
Exploration Ltd. 149 The mining interests were sold for $24.8
million, leaving Westfield essentially a holding company with $25
million in cash and $15 million in securities of other mining
concerns.1 50
The sale was not effected at arm's length, since both the
seller and buyer of the assets, which both had minority shareholding
interests, were ultimately controlled by the Bronfmans.151
148 bd.
149 Northgate was controlled by Great Lakes Group Inc, another company in the
Hees/Bronfman empire and was thus itself a Bronfman controlled company. The deal in
question was actually a complex transaction involving three companies: Westfield, Northgate,
and Norwest Holdings Inc. Before the transaction occurred, Westfield owned 10 per cent of
Northgate and 51 per cent of Norwest. The other 49 per cent of Norwest was owned by
Northgate. Reduced to its simplest terms, the deal between the three companies involved
Westfield selling all of its mining properties to Norwest and its 51 per cent stake in Norwest
to Northgate. Thus, when the dust settled, Northgate held 100 per cnt of the shares of
Norwest and thus indirectly owned the mining assets formerly owned by Westfield (including
the Choquelimpie mine property). After the transaction, Westfield retained its 10 per cent
interest in Northgate. See "Control of Westfield Sold to Bronfman Group Outpost" Northern
Miner (27 February 1989) 15; "Hees Group to Keep Westfield Busy" Northern Miner (29 May
1989) 13; "Northgate Buys Stake in Chilean Mine" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (11
November 1989) B6; P. Kennedy, "Westfield's Sale of Chilean Mine Draws Criticism" Northern
Miner (13 November 1989) 1; D. Francis, "Westfield Deal Shows Need for Minority Rights"
Financial Post (25 January 1990) 3; D. Francis, "Shareholders to Fight Agreement by Peter
Bronfman Companies" Financial Post (4 April 1990) 6; "Westfield Minerals" The [Toronto]
Globe and Mail (27 April 1990) B13; "Bronfman Company Stock Swap Comes Under Official
Scrutiny" Financial Post (27 April 1990) 6; K. Noble, "New Rules Would Have Helped" The
[Toronto] Globe and Mail (24 May 1990) B4; J. Heinzl, "Westfield Shareholders Win Mining
Valuation" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (26 May 1990) B7; G. Scotton, Westfield Agrees
to Have Northgate Deal Valuation" Financial Post (28 May 1990) 17; "Westfield Minerals" The
[Toronto] Globe and Mail (26 June 1990) B21; A. Robinson, "Westfield Investors Question
Valuation" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (29 June 1990) Bl; G. Gransden, 'Westfield
Minority Airs Gripes" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (30 June 1990) BS; and G. Scotton,
"Westfield Grilled on Share Swap" Financial Post (2 July 1990) 18.
150 Ibi.
151 Ibid.
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Nonetheless, the Westfield directors elected to proceed with the sale
of assets without a shareholder vote1 52 and without an independent
valuation of the mining properties.1 53
The non-arm's length sale of Westfield assets precipitated
complaints from minority shareholders alleging that the consideration
received for the assets was inadequate.1 54  Although these
complaints were reported in the financial press,1 5 5  Westfield
directors refused to review the transaction or to put it to an
independent valuation or a shareholder vote, asserting that the
transaction was fair and had been approved by a committee of
independent directors.156 After some months of inaction, a group
of minority shareholders complained to the Director of the Canada
Business Corporations Act and to the o.s.c! 57 A second group of
shareholders, under the banner of the Committee of Dissident
Westfield Shareholders, solicited donations from other shareholders
152 Ibid.
153 The decision to proceed without a shareholder vote may well have violated section
189(3) of the CB.C.A., supra, note 34 which requires an approving shareholder vote in the
case of a decision to sell "all of substantially all the property of a corporation other than in
the ordinary course of business." The courts have found this provision to be triggered by sales
which effect a qualitative change in the nature of the business carried on, even where the
assets sold constitute less than 50 percent of the total assets of the company. See, e&, Re
85956 Holdings Ltd and Fayerman Brothers Ltd (1986), 25 D.LR. (4th) 119 (Sask. CA.). The
directors of Westfield are reported to have stated that "the delay and expense of a meeting
of shareholders would not be justified as holders of a majority of the shares were in favor."
See Westfield Deal Shows Need For Minority Rights, supra, note 149 at 3. It is difficult to
understand why delay and expense would dispense Westfield from a mandatory statutory
requirement.
154 See, ag., Kennedy, supra, note 149; Shareholders to FightAgreement by Peter Bronfman,
supra, note 149; and Gransden, supra, note 149.
155 See supra, note 149.
156 The Northern Miner reported that "according to Northgate President John Kearney,
the deal was approved unanimously by an independent committee of directors, consisting of
Westfield directors who are not officially associated with Northgate." See Kennedy, supra,
note 149 at 2.
157 The Director, Frederick Sparling, announced that the transaction would be
investigated by the federal Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs. See Bronfinan
Company Stocks Comes Under Official Scrutiny, supra, note 149. The O.S.C. appears to have
been approached some months earlier.
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
and hired a lawyer.158 Nonetheless, a full year after the
announcement of the sale, no action had been taken either by
Westfield, the C.B.C.A. Director, or by the o.s.c.
Ultimately, however, at the end of May 1990, Westfield
relented and agreed to commission an "independent" valuation of the
mining interests by Burns Fry 59 The results of the valuation
supported Westfield's position and suggested that Norwest had paid
too much for Westfield's mining assets.160 The valuation and
approval of the transaction by "independent directors" were
apparently enough to convince the o.s.c and the Director of the
C.B.C.A, to take no further action, and indeed none has been taken
at the time of writing.
The key reasons for an absence of regulatory intervention
appear to be both the independent valuation and approval of the
transaction by independent directors, and indeed these are central
features of the new Policy 9.1,161 crafted in the wake of the
Westfield drama. In our view, both of these shareholder protections
are likely to improve the quality and efficiency of corporate
decision-making, but the Westfield saga is a cautionary tale that
demonstrates the dangers of relying entirely on such procedural
protections to ensure appropriate treatment of minority interests.
The efficacy of an "independent" valuation commissioned by
any company in a vast corporate empire like the Bronfman group of
companies can easily be questioned. Even where the company
commissioning a valuation is a truly independent entity, a valuer
either currently doing business with the corporation or anticipating
158 Shareholders to Fight Agreement by Peter Bronfman, supra, note 149.
159The announcement to commission an independent valuation was made at Westfield's
annual meeting on 25 May 1990. See Heinzl, supra, note 149. The Financial Post quoted
Northgate President and CEO John Kearney as saying "we were absolutely conscious of the
situation and we blew it. We didn't handle it well ... In retrospect, we should have had a
valuation at the time, but hindsight is always 2020." See Westfld Agrees to Have Northgate
Deal Valuation, supra, note 149 at 17. The Financial Post also later quoted Westfield
President Danesh Varma as saying that an independent valuation of the transferred assets
should have been performed at the time of the sale, but was not done because of the cost.
See Westfeld Grilled on Share Swap, supra, note 149 at 18.
160 See infra, notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
161 See supra, note 68. See also infra, notes 174-87 and accompanying text.
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possible future business will have an incentive to arrive at a result
congenial to management, who will decide the disposition of future
business. Since companies performing valuations also frequently will
offer underwriting, brokerage, merchant banking, and other services
to corporate clients, the cost of arousing management's ire may be
large. When the client is a corporation in an extended empire of
companies with a common controller, the cost of raising
management's dander may be overwhelming. In such a case,
"management" is no longer the management of a single entity, but
the controllers of the vast panoply of related companies with the
power to distribute an enormous volume of lucrative securities
related business. In these circumstances, there are pressures on the
valuer to deliver a report acceptable to management. It is perhaps
for this reason that it is virtually unheard of for an investment
banker or other valuer to deliver a fairness opinion or valuation that
does not reflect management's view.
Although we do not purport to pass judgment on the
accuracy of the valuation performed by Burns Fry, we do note that
the result was congenial to management. The report showed the
value of Westfield's mining interests (sold for $24.8 million) as
between $15.7 and $18.8 million, and thus purported to show that
Westfield received too much for the mining assets sold to
Northgate. 162 It is also worth pointing out how sensitive this
valuation was to a variety of rather indeterminate parameters.
These included the ore reserves, the prices of gold and silver on
world markets, and an appropriate discount rate which must reflect,
amongst other things, the political risks of doing business in Chile.
A change in assumptions about any one of these parameters could
result in a very different result. For example, while the Burns Fry
valuation assumed that ore reserves would last until 1992, Westfield's
own 1988 year-end report suggested that production might extend to
162 See "Bronfman Asset Deal" Financial Post (27 June 1990) 19; Robinson, supra, note
149; and Westfield Grilled on Share Swap, supra, note 149. The Financial Post had earlier
quoted Northgate President John Kearney as saying: "If anybody got screwed it wasn't who
you think it was," intimating that Northgate had paid too much for the assets." See Westfield
Grilled on Share Swap, supra, note 149 at 18.
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1995-96.163 Furthermore, press reports indicated the distinct
possibility that further exploratory drilling would result in expansion
of proven ore reserves! 64 In addition, there was a large measure of
disagreement between Westfield and its minority shareholders over
the applicable discount rate. The Burns Fry valuation applied an
18 per cent rate, while minority shareholders asserted that a three
per cent rate was appropriate 65 Finally, as we noted above,
management generally has an incentive (whether consciously or
unconsciously) to colour the information given to the valuer to
ensure an appropriate result. While we cannot say if this happened
in the Westfield case, there was at least a real possibility that this
was so.
Our point is not that the valuation commissioned by
Westfield was necessarily in error, but rather that there was ample
room for a valuer to produce a result sympathetic to management
by making small adjustments in any of these key parameters.
Because such a result is likely to generate repeat business for the
valuer, there are obvious incentives for a putatively "independent"
valuer to favour management's view.
In defending the sale of assets, Westfield put much stock on
the fact that the sale had been approved by a committee of
"independent" directors otherwise unaffiliated with either Westfield
or Northgate.166 But, as we have indicated, there are a number of
grounds for questioning the efficacy of this type of shareholder
protection. One is that the directors may not in fact be sufficiently
distanced from the corporation to be truly disinterested and
163 See Westfield Grilled on Share Swap, supra, note 149, reporting remarks of Bill Haney,
a minority shareholder, to a Westfield shareholders' meeting. Mr. Haney is also reported to
have said that the reserves "seem to have dropped a considerable amount in a very short
time." Ibid at 18. The day before, The [Toronto] Globe and Mail reported that the Bums
Fry valuation showed a shorter mine life because of a decision to expand capacity and
production. See Robinson, supra, note 149.
164 See, ag., Choquelimpie, supra, note 147 and Robinson, supra, note 149. The
Committee of Dissident Shareholders argued that "[v]ital to the evaluation of these mining
assets, and especially the ... Choquelimpie property, is not a simplistic arithmetic computation
of proven ore reserves and related tonnage, but, of 'potential' - the iceberg whose tip is
merely showing at this point in time." Robinson, ibid. at Bl.
165 Robinson, ibid.
166 See, e-g, Kennedy, supra, note 149.
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dispassionate decision-makers. The Westfield saga is a case in point.
At least two of the reputedly independent directors were in fact
officers or directors of other corporations in the Hees/Bronfman
group of companies. 167 Moreover, setting the power and economic
penetration of an elaborate corporate empire like the Bronfman's
against the background of a relatively small economic stage
highlights the difficulty of securing objectivity. From a business
perspective, the client served by an independent director in a case
like Westfield is not Westfield alone, but the Hees/Bronfnan group
of companies which control Westfield. Given the relatively small
pool of directorial talent in Canada, it will often be difficult to find
directors who are not connected either by business or social links to
important players in the corporate group.
Even those without present connections to key players may
well anticipate or seek out future linkages, so that their judgment
also will be shaded. Furthermore, although shareholders elect
directors, it is the inside managers who decide who shall be
nominated to serve as directors.1 68 Outside directors therefore owe
their continued tenure to the consent of insiders, which undeniably
raises the cost of opposition to management initiatives. The
psychological advantage possessed by insiders is cemented by their
obvious informational advantage. Insiders who devote all of their
energies to the corporation will be much more familiar with its
workings than will outsiders whose attention is intermittent and who
receive all of their information from insiders.169 It is thus not
surprising that empirical studies both in the United States and
Canada have concluded that outside directors feel beholden to
management and play a very limited role in protecting shareholder
interests.170
167 These were Brian Lawson, an officer of Canadian Express, and CJ. Cunningham-
Dunlop, a director of Orofino Resources Ltd, a company controlled by Northgate. See
Westfield Deal Shows Need for Minority Rights, supra, note 149.
168 Of course, the degree of control exercised by insiders over outsiders is greater where
the inside managers closely represent the interests of the controlling shareholder, as in the
Westfield case.
169 See supra, note 53 and accompanying text.
170 See supra, note 54 and accompanying text.
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Where the inside directors present a monolithic front and
strongly urge the propriety of an action which the outside directors
have been asked to pass upon, it will be that much more costly,
both psychologically and otherwise, for the outsiders to oppose
management. In the Westfield case, six of thirteen Westfield
directors were also Northgate executives7 1z  Moreover, the
President of Westfield, Danesh Varma, was also a director of
Canadian Express, Pagurian Corp., and American Resource, all of
the companies in the control hierarchy that connected Westfield to
Hees International, and was a director of Hees International as
well 72 It must have been clear to the outside directors that, in
opposing the sale of Westfield assets, they would be opposing, not
only the unanimous view of Westfield's insiders, but in fact the will
of the Hees/Bronfman empire. In the result, approval of the
transaction by a putatively independent committee of directors
cannot be regarded as dispositive of its propriety.
Institutional shareholders were conspicuously absent from the
Westfield drama. This was no accident. Westfield is a second
market company without material institutional holdings. Although
shareholders were able to organize themselves and ultimately
achieved some measure of success by securing a third party
valuation, the presence of large institutional holders undoubtedly
would have led to increased pressure on management and ultimately
might have secured a result more satisfactory to the minority
shareholders. Institutional shareholders generally have larger stakes,
better incentives to police management, more resources to oppose
managerial initiatives, better access to the press, regulators, and
management, and lower costs of collective action 73 The cost and
difficulty of organizing minority interests in companies like Westfield
171 Kennedy, supra, note 149. Somewhat inconsistently, The [Toronto] Globe and Mail
reported that there were four Westfield directors who were also directors and officers of
Northgate or its subsidiaries. It reported that these directors were John Kearney, Patrick
Downey, Sylvester Boland, and C.J. Cunningham-Dunlop. See Gransden, supra, note 149.
172 Gransden, ibid.
173 The Westfield saga need only be compared to the attempted takeover of Canadian
Tire by its dealers to illustrate what a difference the presence of institutional shareholdings
makes.
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and securing access to the press and to regulators typically will mean
a lower level of protection for these interests.
Although the o.s.r, was slow to react to the complaints of
minority Westfield shareholders, the proximate result of the
Westfield saga was the release for comment on 23 May 1990 of
draft revisions to o.s.c. Policy 9.1, the final version of which was
adopted on 5 July 1991.174 The policy, which previously dealt only
with issuer bids, insider bids, and going private transactions, now
includes in addition any "related party transaction," which includes
any transaction between the corporation and a party in a position to
exercise influence over the control of the corporation.! 75 Had the
policy been in place when the Westfield transaction took place,
Westfield would have been obligated to put the transaction to a
shareholder vote, excluding all control votes and all votes directed
by an "interested party."176 In addition, an outside valuation would
have been required 77 However, the policy would not have
required approval of the Westfield transaction by a committee of
independent directors. Rather, the policy merely states that "issuers
involved in a related party transaction should consider and if
reasonable to do so" have the transaction reviewed and approved by
a 'special committee' of outside directors.1 78
The revisions to the policy leave in place the previous
requirements for extended disclosure and an independent valuation
accompanying issuer bids, insider bids, and going private transactions
and extend these requirements to related party transactions. An
attempt has been made to make the valuation requirement more
meaningful in a number of ways. First, the valuer must be
"qualified" and "independent."179 Second, an attempt is made to
articulate acceptable valuation methods and to ensure that the
174 See supra, note 69.
175 Ibid. Part I, para. 2.2(15).
176 Ibid. Part I, para. 2.2(7) and 2.2(10); Part V, para. 18 and 20; and Part VI, para.
23.1.
177 Ibid.
178 Ibid. Part V, para. 19 and Part VII, para. 27.
179 Ibid. Part VI, para. 23.1. See, generally, para. 23.
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valuer has adequate access to information necessary to make the
valuation1 80 Third, the valuer must present a reasonably detailed
report showing not only the result of the valuation, but the valuer's
credentials, the terms of compensation, assumptions made, methods
used, and other factors.1 81 In addition, a number of exceptions to
the valuation requirement are outlined, some of which were not
present in the former Policy 9.1.182 As before, a summary of the
valuation must be sent to shareholders, and the results of prior
valuations must be disclosed. 183
As indicated above, the minority approval requirement is
made applicable both to going private transactions and significant
asset transactions, and the definition of minority approval is changed
to ensure exclusion of votes controlled by interested parties.18 4
Although approval by a committee of independent directors is not
made mandatory, guidelines for the establishment of an independent
committee are set out.185
Policy 9.1 recognizes the dangers inherent in related party
transactions. However, we have some reservations about the policy.
More particularly, we have noted the limits of independent
180 Ibid Part VI, para. 24.
181 Ibid. Part VI, para. 24.4(1) states:
The formal valuation report must disclose the identity and credentials of the firm
performing the formal valuation, the identity and credentials of any individuals who
were principally responsible for the report's preparation, the date the valuer was
first contacted in respect of the transaction, the date on which the valuer was
retained, the financial terms of the retainer, the subject matter of the formal
valuation, the date of the formal valuation, the scope and purpose of the formal
valuation, the meaning of the word "value" in the circumstances, a description of the
type of information and sources upon which the valuer relied, a description of the
type of any information the valuer requested but was denied, the valuation
approaches considered, the key assumptions made, the relative importance attached
to assumptions made and factors considered, any other experts relied upon and the
valuation conclusion reached. The source of any fact which is material to the
formal valuation must be clearly stated, including sufficient detail so that the
significance of the fact can be reasonably assessed by a user of the report.
See, generally, para. 24A.
182 Ibid. Part V, para. 18.2 and Part VI, para. 26.
183 Ibid Part VI, para. 24.5 and 24.6.
184 Ibid. Part I, para. 2.2(10).
185 Ibid. Part VII, para. 27.
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valuations and approval by a committee of independent directors.
There is some danger that the procedural protections of Policy 9.1
will be interpreted as a complete certification of the propriety of a
related party transaction. In other words, Policy 9.1 may provide a
procedural safe harbour for related party transactions that insulates
some suspect transactions from regulatory or judicial review. While
securing an approval by independent directors and/or an
independent valuation may "freshen the atmosphere, 'a s 6 courts and
administrators must be sensitive to the difficulties of securing
genuinely "independent" oversight by outside directors or valuers in
Canada.
The requirement to secure approval of a majority of the
disinterested shareholders is probably a more effective shareholder
protection, provided that shareholders are provided with the
necessary facts upon which to base a meaningful judgment. There
is little reason to believe that minority interests will be influenced by
the fear of management retaliation for voting against a management
proposal. Where the corporation has secured minority approval only
after obtaining an approval of the independent directors and/or an
independent valuation, the minority approval would carry some
added weight. However, even in the face of such an approval,
courts and administrators would do well to remember that, while the
votes of minority shareholders may not be corrupted by the sorts of
pressures that might divert the minds of outside directors or valuers,
there are other reasons to believe that minority approval should not
be regarded as a complete certification of fairness. In particular,
management control of the proxy machinery combined with
shareholder collective action problems are bound to inhibit the
expression of shareholder dissent. This will be particularly true in
the second market, where there are few institutional investors, the
majority of the company's shareholders will hold small and transient
stakes in the company, and the problem of "free riders" will be
severe. In these circumstances, there may not be many shareholders
who take the time to inform themselves adequately to wield their
votes effectively: many simply will return their proxies to
186 We borrow this phrase, in slightly altered form, from Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical
Corp., 91 A.2d 57 at 59 (Del. S.C., 1952), which held that upon ratification of an alleged
wrong by a majority of the minority of shareholders "the entire atmosphere is freshened."
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management without reviewing the proxy material or will fail to
return their proxies at all.
Finally, we add that courts and administrators must not lose
sight of the fact that the requirement to secure the approval of a
majority of disinterested shareholders creates dangers of opportunism
by a minority of shareholders, who may use their power of veto in
an extortionate manner to secure a larger share of the "take" than
that to which they are truly entitled. The danger will be particularly
severe where there is a single shareholder or coalition of
shareholders, who hold a majority of the minority shares. Just as it
is impossible to delve into the minds of directors (whether insiders
or outsiders) and ascertain their motives for acting, it is impossible
to directly ascertain the motives of minority shareholders. Courts
and administrators must be sensitive to this danger and be prepared
to dispense with the minority approval requirement where
appropriate 87
VI. CONCLUSION
Our goal in writing this article has been to establish some
tentative guideposts to assist Canadian policy-makers in addressing
many of the challenges that they will confront in the next decade.
Focusing attention on the distinctive features of Canadian markets
will, we believe, give greater precision and clarity to the policy-
making process in the corporate and securities area.
In framing much of our discussion, we readily acknowledge
that many of our observations are qualified and tentative. Yet,
given the relative paucity of data that exists in many areas, we felt
duty bound to be somewhat modest in formulating ambitious policy
initiatives. To do otherwise would, we believe, fall prey to the
temptation of speculative policy-making which is only too often the
manner in which Canadian policy is formed.
187 Policy 9.1, supra, note 69 does in fact recognize this danger. See Part I, para. 1.4.
See, however, In re M.Loeb, Limited, (December 1978), O.S.C.B. 333, in which the
Commission declined to waive the requirement for a majority of the minority approval of a
going private transaction where a single shareholder maneuvered itself into a hold-out position.
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There is, however, one clear proposal that we wish to
advance. It comes in the form of a plea for greater support for and
understanding of the rigorous mode of empirical analysis that we
have argued for in this article. Given the opportunity to generate
an empirical mapping of the marketplace that will highlight the
nature and sources of market imperfections, we believe that
legislators and administrators who formulate policy bear an
increasingly heavy burden of demonstrating market inefficiency
before regulatory interventions can be justified.
Thus far, this onus has largely gone undischarged. This is
unfortunate, for we feel that the time is well past when regulatory
interventions could be justified by simple declaratory assertions about
the achievement of market efficiency, completely unsupported by
hard evidence or even a clear understanding of what efficiency
entails.

